Rural Development in the Crossfire

The Role of Grassroots Support Organizations in Situations of Political Violence in Peru

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Postdata

This study was originally prepared in 1990 when the armed conflict in Peru was worsening and pulling the country deeper into the maelstorm of violence and instiutional breakdown. It was published as a monograph by the IDRC in 1991 and as a small book in Spanish by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Both are now out of print so I am making them available on the Internet.

More material about Sendero can be found in the issues of Sendero File that came out in 1992 under the auspices of the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC, USA. They track the high watermark of Sendero's influence and the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman. You may also want to see my news reporting for the period. A look at the

broader implications of the Peruvian crisis can be found in an essay that I wrote in 1985.

The three years that I spent study political violence in Peru were the most intellectually challenging period of my life. I traveled throughout the country and spent weeks in remote communities guided by local leaders. I also had the freedom to spend long hours stewing over my experiences, my interview notes, reading the literature and playing my ideas off people who were far more knowledgeable about Peru than I was. Even today, I find that that experience still leaves much material to be tapped. I am searching for the right venue to bring it together.

Introduction

Grassroots support organizations (GSOs) or development promotion centers have played a crucial role in rural development in Peru. Their impact goes far beyond the amount of funds invested in the countryside. They have served as social laboratories in efforts to break through the bottlenecks of development in the Peruvian Andes. They have frequently provided a safety net and catalyst for grassroots organizations and local communities. By mustering strength and resources, the emerging social groups have staked a claim as protagonists on the regional and national stage since 1980, a rising tide of political violence has swept across the country. By the end of the decade, the conflict had cost nearly 20,000 lives and billions of dollars in damages. The social and political dynamics set loose by this trend have called into question the viability of civilian institutions and democratic government itself. It has also blocked development prospects in rural areas of the country. Naturally, this violence touches the centers along with Peruvian society and communities which are the objective of their programs. Indeed, they have found, at times, that they become targets for the belligerent forces.

The sharp rise in violence in late 1988 drove home to GSOs and other institutions a disturbing fact. Violence was going to be a constant shadow in their work. This realization was disconcerting. Awareness of its full consequence has just started to sink in. The threat from political violence touches the centers in several ways. It puts in jeopardy the centers as institutions in their own right, reducing their capacity to carry out their programs. It poses a serious impediment to development itself in the midst of Peru's worst crisis this century.

On a personal plane, violence questions private development work as a option for channeling an individual preoccupation for the wellbeing of underprivileged sectors into practical actions and organization, as a professional career option and as a way of life.Peru is not unique in having a non-conventional war or low-intensity conflict take place in its territory. Peruvian GSOs and foreign consultants, however, have not found any literature on the role of development agencies in situations of political violence. Perhaps, there exist evaluations about

grassroots support organizations and centers which have remained in internal documents, due to their sensitive nature.

This paper proposes to address this vacuum contributing to an evaluation of GSOs, local partners, funding agencies and other interested parties and how they can fulfill their roles. Because Peru is under extreme social, political and economic duress, it offers an opportunity to examine their practices in conceiving, planning and putting into action programs for rural development. This situation requires a reassessment of many assumptions which staff members and experts take for granted. It is also our opinion that much of this questioning may be applicable to development programs in general. This report does not aim to examine specific rural development programs or practices. This task lies beyond the author's capacity. It aims to survey GSOs within the context of political violence. However, we may comment on some aspects which have a direct bearing on the report.

We divide the report into five sections:
A general discussion of Peruvian GSOs over the past two decades with special emphasis on how political violence has affected their work. We will discuss the major incidents involving GSOs and belligerent groups, without being comprehensive. When pertinent, we will also mention other development programs.

1. A description of the belligerent forces operating in Peru and how they perceive GSOs.

   Two case studies: Ayacucho and Puno.

2. An analysis of GSOs in local settings and the social and political forces which build up around them.

3. Conclusions.

In addition, the text contains a series of higlighted remarks. We felt that it was more important to highlight them in context rather than to extract them into the conclusions. Due to the length of the text and treatment of the issues, they tended to get lost the case studies and general discussion. The goals are three-fold. This essay aims to provide a systemization of material on centers and political violence with enough background information to aid donor agencies and GSOs to understand the domestic situation and make more informed decisions about funding and executing Peruvian projects. Second, we will draft preliminary conclusions abo ut the situation, with the understanding that they are tentative and prone to simplification. Third, we will hopefully provide a few elements that might be applicable to other societies that are facing armed conflicts. However, it is not the intention of this paper to become a manual for operating in zones of political violence. Local and national conditions vary widely.

Methodology

The International Development Research Centre of Canada though its Latin American and Caribbean regional office provided funding for research and writing on grassroots support organizations. This opportunity allowed me to repay a debt of gratitude to GSOs and centers in Peru which have provided me with insight, first-hand information and encouragement over the past 12 years in Peru. It also opened up a series of research avenues that I will try to follow in the future.

The body of this paper comes from interviews with staff members of centers working in rural areas. I consulted a bibliography on rural development and subversive violence in Peru. Though disperse and little known, there is a growing body of work that made this investigation easier
In past research, I found it important to keep a geographical orientation in case studies. I have carried out field work in Puno-Cusco (June, 1989) and Cajamarca (July-August, 1989). Since I had visited both sites previously, the field work was especially propitious in leading me to crucial areas of analysis. I drew source material on Ayacucho from three trips to the city before the consulting work.
The broader analysis about Peruvian belligerent groups was made possible by a research and writing grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Program on Peace and International Cooperation. The investigation was carried out from mid-1987 to mid-1989. This research provided field experience in Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Puno and Cusco.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Marcial Rubio, Elmer Galván and Luis Román for having suffered through the reading of a preliminary and confused draft of this report. The hours spent talking about my errors and misunderstandings helped clarify key concepts. They broadened my perspective at a crucial point in the investigation by giving me feedback from their professional experience in rural development. They turned the report into a more professional product. Naturally, any remaining mistakes or misconceptions lie in my hard-headed benightedness and the vexing complexities of Peruvian reality, rural development and political violence.
I would also like to thank Manuel Iguiñez, Ricardo Vega, Tiziano Zanelli, Steven Judd, Alfredo Stecher, Enrique Moya, Vera Gianotten and Ton DeWit for much insight into the challenges of rural development in Peru. Many other sources, including local partners in promotion programs, will remain unmentioned for security reasons.

The Warring Factions

In 1980, the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), known to the rest of the world as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), gave a violent tug on the frayed fabric of impoverished Ayacucho and the snag was felt throughout the woof and warp of Peru. Although violence has been a factor in the past 500 years, linked to deeply rooted social, economic, ethnic and structural problems, Peruvian society has faced a major escalation this decade.

Although other Latin American countries meet similar threats to the viability of their civilian institutions, Peru faces a specially complex array of adversaries. This trend has also introduced an erratic, unpredictable variable, combined with a breakdown of the normal channels for conflict resolution.

One measure of how far the situation has degenerated comes from the United States government. The State Department has placed Peru in the same risk category as El Salvador, Colombia and Lebanon because of terrorist activities. Although there are substantial differences in the quality and nature of political violence in these countries, this classification is due to the incidence or number of terrorist acts. Other foreign governments have arrived at the same conclusion about Peru's condition. For Europe, this classification can have a direct impact on GSO funding because many donor agencies have matching fund agreements with their national governments.

In the past 40 years, grassroots organizations, like campesinos and urban squatters, have employed tactics not sanctioned by the law and even acts of force to achieve their goals. They have, however, normally avoided outright and systematic violence in the pursuit of their objectives.

Because of the nature of this low-intensity conflict and the threat of institutionalizing violence as a political instrument, we will describe the major players whom grassroots organizations and their support agencies must face in the field.

Communist Party of Peru
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)

The party came into being in 1970, breaking off from the Maoist Communist Party of Peru-Bandera Roja (Red Flag). The central core of Sendero, however, actually existed as the regional committee of the original Communist Party since 1964. Its main seedbed was the National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga and the public school system in the area. The key leader and thinker behind it is Abimael Guzmán, known by his nom de guerre, Chairman Gonzalo.

In the mid-1970s, Sendero's leadership decided that the time had come to start an armed uprising along the lines drafted by Mao Zedong in China. This decision required strengthening and fine-tuning a national party structure for the task. The Principal Regional (Ayacucho) and the Metropolitan Lima committees were the backbone of the organization, four other regional organizations started the gradual process of building its war machine.

Because party-sanctioned ideology has the weight of the Bible, it predetermines how its local cadres will observe and interpret reality. According to Sendero's version, Peru is a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society in which a form of bureaucratic capitalism holds sway. In more comprehendible terms, Peru is an underdeveloped, Third World country in which power is still wielded through semi-feudal means (control of the land as a political lever) and subordinated to imperialistic powers. The economy is dominated by monopolistic and merchantilist intermediaries for world powers which use the State to squeeze more exploitation from the population. (PCP 1988, II, 4-5)

In Sendero's thinking, what distinguishes Peru is that the conditions have matured for staging armed struggle and the one missing factor over the past 100 years -- a revolutionary leadership in the form of the Communist Party of Peru -- has fit into place.
Sendero holds out a utopian prospect of a world made anew through revolutionary struggle within a timeframe of a couple of decades. In the society which Sendero will set up, all failings would disappear -- children will not starve to death, men will not commit adultery or get drunk and mothers will not abandon their children. At a grassroots level, this kind of message has appeal and impact, compared to the breakdown of moral and ethic standards, corruption and chaos prevailing in large parts of Peru. This ideal future world, however, must first be won.

What does this mean in practical terms for rural development? Sendero's Maoist ideology, accentuated by Guzmán's thinking, requires a prolonged rural guerrilla war, drawing on the peasantry as a social base. This objective requires breaking the hold of semi-feudalism on the peasantry. Another target is imperialist dominion in the countryside.(PCP 1988, II, 5-6) From Sendero's sectarian view, grassroots support organizations represent an attempt by imperialist powers (predominantly European and American governments and donor agencies) to strengthen the imprisoning chains of capitalism in rural Peru.
In September, 1989, **El Diario**, a semi-official mouthpiece for Sendero, came out with a full condemnation of centers, relief work and charity efforts, including the Catholic Church. "Imperialism and social imperialism, through the furtherance of their `promotion centers,' intend to replace the tasks that correspond to this State to realize in public works. (This is) an attitude which fulfills one of the objectives of counterinsurgency policy by encouraging pacifism, the conciliation of classes and free (unremunerated) work, diverting the people's struggle towards electoral idiocy."

For Sendero, the presence of development programs, either through government or non-government agencies, is a crucial juncture in the evolution of capitalism in rural areas. It is the point at which rural producers become locked into the market. It is preferable for rural communities recede to Stone Age conditions that start a process which would lead to stronger ties to a bourgeois society.

This schematic interpretation of Peruvian reality, however, would remain a bizarre exercise in the dark arts of dialectic materialism if Sendero did not match it with an astutely designed and meticulously planned military strategy for taking power. Sendero starts with a flexible military-political strategy designed to work within the complex geographical, economic, social setting of the Andes. It carefully builds up from grassroots levels, taking full advantage of the backlog of local conflicts. Sendero exploits the tensions built up in the urban-rural continuum (issues like demand for public services and spending, the capitalist market and land conflicts). It makes a consistent, coherent use of violence as a means of intimidation and consolidation of alternative authority. It disrupts the chance of other political options from emerging or taking root in the local setting. It proposes a long-term societal model which aims to integrate society through its armed struggle. It makes use of effective pedagogical

mechanisms which help it to reproduce its membership and ideology under adverse conditions.(Smith 1990)
More specifically on its organization, Sendero has centered its resources on creating a military apparatus capable of sustaining a self-sufficient revolution against the existing state. First, it is characterized by the single-minded subordination of the party, its cadres and resources to its military and political goals. This militarization has permitted Sendero to demonstrate a close, measurable relationship between objectives, actions and results. Second, it has a vertical, authoritarian structure and cell organization which has been almost impossible to infiltrate or break. The party leadership is a stable, permanent war staff, held in strategic reserve. This provides long-term planning "strategically centralized and tactically de centralized" and constant evaluation of the situation. Third, there is an absolute rejection of all organizations which do not subordinate themselves to the militarized party. (Smith 1990) An outgrowth of militarization is that "the Party's work with masses is carried out through the Army." (PCP 1988, IV, 1)

Unlike most left wing parties, Sendero has never used centers as instruments of its political strategy, though its members or sympathizers may have worked in them for short periods. This policy may be changing in the future. Luis Arce Borja, the former director of El Diario, gave a conference in Belgium in 1989, shortly after the killings of the two French development volunteers in Haquira, Apurimac. When pressed to explain why Sendero has assassinated the foreign volunteers, he claimed that six donor agencies were working in favor of the García administration, IU, ideological and political infiltration. "If you travel with and support García Pérez and his counterinsurgency and criminal plans, naturally you convert yourself into a target of the revolution, just as a campesino does when he goes over to the ranks of the Army." (Quehacer No. 59, 30-2)

Senderista pointmen, including Arce Borja, had approached European donor agencies. His revealing remarks showed that their inquiries had not turned up positive results. There have also been reports from some rural provinces of new promotion centers opening as a front for Senderista activity, though this may be a defensive mechanisms of provincial societies to reject unknown outsiders.
Carlos Ivan Degregori says that since Sendero has defined Peru as semi-feudal, it encounters other phenomenon in the Andes that do not fit into its vision. On his Long March, Mao did not meet engineers repairing power pylons, agronomists doing extension work and anthropologists advising campesino federations. "I consider that the degree of violence which SL develops is so great, among other causes, because it has to adapt reality to the idea and for this they not only have to stop time but turn it back." (Degregori 1989, 22)

From Sendero's perspective, GSOs, grassroots organizations and rural development, along with political parties, religious faiths and decadent bourgeois government, is "a pile of garbage traditionally inherited which we must clear away gradually," citing Engles (PCP 1988, V, 5). This kind of institutions and groups is the waste products of history or obstacles in the way of revolutionary creation.

In the final analysis, all projects and institutions not anointed by and subservient to Sendero will eventually come under its sights. With such a long hitlist, however, Sendero has a backlog of targets. Much depends on priorities and circumstances as to how often the guerrilla group puts its sights on GSOs and their local partners. Shining Path has preferred to chip away at the vulnerable underpinnings of Peruvian society, rather than stage an all-out assault on the government. It aims to wipe out the state and capitalism even if that means condemning the populace to Stone-Age subsistence.
Sendero operates in the Andes from the Huamachuco province of La Libertad department in the north down to Apurimac, encroaching on the western slopes around Lima. Its southern pole of development is in Puno, provinces of Azangaro and Melgar. It also operates in broad swaths of the jungle, like the Upper and Central Huallaga, the Apurimac-Tambo river valleys (Ayacucho and Junin departments). Sendero claims that it has spread its tentacles to all 24 departments in the country.
However, Sendero has been unsuccessful in entering the northern Sierra, including most of Cajamarca, Piura and Amazonas. It has also failed repeatedly to penetrate Cusco.

Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA)

MRTA owes its political space to Sendero. The first three years of the Senderista offensive were disconcerting. Sendero showed that it was possible to engage in guerrilla warfare against a government that had inherent weaknesses. The protracted debate within the Marxist left as to whether the subjective and objective conditions for revolution were present was settled. Sendero, through its ruthless tactics and sectarian ideology, pushed back the frontier of tolerable political activities. The MRTA leaders thought that Sendero was giving armed revolution a bad name.

MRTA came together from the Marxist splinter groups that maintained loyal to the premise that effective social change would only come through armed violence. They were dissident factions which rejected mainstream parties' enthusiasm for legitimate politics, including participation in elections and Congress. The initial spark actually came during the chaotic 1980 negotiations to form a broad left wing coalition (Alianza Revolucionario de Izquierda, ARI). The coalition dealings collapsed, but the seeds and contacts for sedition were laid. Their initial actions seemed like Robin-Hood gestures, distributing "expropriated goods" in shantytowns and bank robberies. It even apologized publicly for killing a policeman in front of an embassy.
When it entered into action in early 1984, it was, in effect, preparing for the day when the rest of the Marxist left would have to go underground. It was a commonly held belief in left wing circles in the early 1980s that Belaúnde would not serve out his term and a coup d'etat would send the Marxist parties back into clandestine activities. MRTA would be the armed wing of IU.

MRTA finances its operations through bank robberies, extortion, contributions through the sale of bonds and other activities. MRTA applies

this same practice to businessmen and shoptenders. It may also receive financing and assistance from abroad, probably Cuba.
The organization has international contacts which disturb the Peruvian military. It fits into the Latin American tradition of romantic guerrillas, which has its roots in Cuba, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the Montoneros of Argentina and the Sandinistas. Some members went to Nicaragua to fight on the side of the Sandinistas in the late 1970s. For a time, it integrated the Batallón América with the Colombian M-19 and the Ecuadorian "Viva Alfaro, Carajo." Two Peruvians died in fighting in Colombia. It has contacts with other insurgent groups, like the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador. It may also have received arms from abroad. Its strategies and actions fit neatly into the pattern of insurgent groups in Latin America. However, with the falling fortunes of armed insurrections in the region, MRTA is finding that its role models and international allies are moving away from the political use of violence.
MRTA has steered clear of attacking GSOs and their local partners. It has sent letters and made visits to GSOs requesting contributions to their cause. MRTA leaders have in the past worked in GSOs. A MRTA founder helped set up a major Lima center in the mid-1970s. A minority of the smaller centers and individual staffers may hold some sympathies for MRTA. Because MRTA expects an authoritarian or military regime in Peru's future, it does not want to antagonize potential allies should other left wing forces decide for guerrilla warfare.

In other words, MRTA follows a war logic different from Sendero's. It may use centers as a cover for activists in a zone, but centers are not a means of penetration. It may collect information through its activists, but GSOs do not serve as purveyors of intelligence.
The Unidad Democrática Popular (UDP), a coalition of splinter groups operating outside the United Left, has thinly disguised sympathies towards MRTA. It functions as its political arm. UDP has concentrated its political efforts on militant union federations, like mineworkers, and some campesino organizations. It also participates within the National Popular Assembly. A weekly magazine, **Cambio**, serves as its public outlet.

MRTA originally confined its activities to urban areas and coastal pocket, (Lima, Ica, Chimbote, Trujillo). In November, 1987, MRTA opened up its first full-scale guerrilla front in the Middle Huallaga valley. The occupation of San José de Sisa took place with heavy media coverage and even interviews with column commanders. It has since expanded its areas of operation to the Middle, Lower Huallaga and Lower Mayo valleys, the Ene-Penene river basin and Junín in the central Sierra.
It has frequently tried to pressure the government into increasing investment in its base areas. It kidnaped the president of the San Martin development corporation in 1988 for this purpose. In 1985, it offered an informal cease-fire to the newly inaugurated García administration on the condition that the new government make just settlements with unions and increase the minimum wage. It also demanded the suspension of debt payments and the expropriation of foreign companies. There have also been signals that at least part of its organization would be willing to

negotiate a peace settlement with the government if the right conditions prevailed.

This "reformist approach" has led Sendero to criticize it for trying to patch the structures of exploitation so it can stay on its feet. More pointedly, Sendero cannot accept other political organizations, armed or pacific, challenging its hegemony in priority zones. These differences have led to open confrontations and armed clashes. In the Upper Huallaga, Junín and the lower jungle foothills, Sendero and MRTA competed for control of territory, including open combats. In the Upper Huallaga, Sendero has passed on information to the army on MRTA cadres, supporters and supply dumps. In 1989, the two bands engaged in gun battles on the campus of San Marcos university.
However, by 1989, MRTA had suffered heavy losses in its feuding with Sendero, fighting with the armed and police forces and more consistent intelligence work by the anti-terrorist police. Because it conformed to Latin American guerrilla practices, it was easier to anticipate its actions and movements. In January, 1989, the army and police wiped out an entire column of 64 guerrillas to a man. Police captured at least two members of its national war council, Victor Polay and Alberto Gálvez. These leaders and 46 other MRTA activists escaped from the Canto Grande maximum security prison in June, 1990.

Other armed groups

With two armed groups already in the field, it is always a temptation for other radicalized groups, especially youth wings of mainstream left wing parties, to join the fray. Pukallacta, Frente Patriótica de Liberación (FPL) and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR-IV Etapa) have all dabbled in setting up guerrilla units. There are also many small cells which are insignificant nationally but can have importance at the grassroots level. At different junctures in the past, some groups within Izquierda Unida began preparation for armed struggle or simply took defensive measures should they become targets for attack by Sendero, the armed forces, the police or right wing death squads. If a coup occurred, the most radicalized IU factions would probably go underground and start guerrilla activities. The youth wing of APRA, influenced by radical Marxist thinking and the party's own history, would probably follow suit. Military sources say that this potential for a wholesale civil war has been a dissuasive factor among malcontent officers tempted to overthrow the García administration.

Peruvian Security Force

Although the Peruvian army has a reputation for being one of the most progressive and social heterogeneous in Latin America, it does not have a clear political vocation, aside from a fascist faction within the Navy. On the other hand, the experience of the past six years of active duty in the emergency zone is changing attitudes. The reform-minded officer corps of the Velasco regime is giving way to officers whose formative experience has been fighting Sendero "with their hands tied behind their backs," as some officers say.
The Peruvian armed forces was reticent to get involved in fighting Sendero. It had just come out of 12 years of authoritarian rule which had damaged the chain of command and pool of officer talent. It had lost popular support

and self-esteem. It was ill-prepared for an internal war, having concentrated over the previous decade on purchasing sophisticated weaponry to defend against a hypothetical two-front war against Chile and Ecuador. Although the army had successfully confronted a guerrilla insurgency in the mid-1960s, most of its counterinsurgency plans were stale, being based on the French school of tactics (Algeria and Indochina). Since 1983, the military has played a leading role in the fight against Sendero and, later, MRTA. However, it has been difficult to evaluate what the military really think about the conflict. The army continues to believe that a maximum application of firepower will defend the insurgents, but the government does not let them. Probably a majority of the officer corps supports a Southern Cone strategy, with no questions asked.

The Peruvian military came to dominate civilian societey TAFOS/Cusco, 1991

"The military, as Brian Jenkins has noted, does not believe it has be `out-proselytized, out-mobilized, or out-fought,' but rather thinks it has been `unreasonably constrained and unjustly criticized' for doing what is necessary to stem the tide of the insurgency." (McCormick 1990, 44, citing unpublished RAND research.)

The Peruvian armed forces has a conscript-based military service, though recruits usually come from the lower classes. Middle and upper class youths easily get an exemption. This imposes several constraints on military tactics. Recruits from the Ayacucho emergency zone do not serve in battalions operating in the same region for fear of infiltration. Coastal and jungle recruits serve in the Sierra. This introduces ethnic, linguistic and cultural distinctions in the relationship between troops and the location populace. Urban soldiers look down on the Sierra Indians. They are ill-prepared for the hardships of operating in high altitude combat zones, with poor supply lines and inefficient logistical support. However, troops in the Huallaga come from the zone itself and perform more adequately.

In the training of the officer corps, there is a sharp distinction between officers rank of colonel and below and those officers groomed for general. The standard instruction and education follows the school of a black and white world -- Christians versus Communists, United States versus the Soviet Union. For officers with superior commands in their future, the

armed forces offers intensive courses in the Center for High Military Studies (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares-CAEM). There the chosen few are given a political veneer and a more sophisticated vision of the world. This separation in professionalization processes explains why line officers do not have the capacity to discern political nuances among left-leaning groups and institutions.

"If Peru's anti-guerrilla experience over the past eight years accurately reflects the views, doctrine, capabilities, and constraints that shape current planning, the army has little appreciation for the dimensions of the problem it faces, little interest in or understanding of the principles of counterinsurgency, insufficient means to conduct a successful unconventional campaign, and no prospect of improving its material position in the foreseeable future. It performance has suffered accordingly." (McCormick 1990: 33)

National Police Force

The 86,000-strong National Police Force has had to carry the brunt of counterinsurgency in non-emergency zone areas and also play a subordinated role to the armed forces in emergency zones. It suffers from the rivalries among the three former police services -- Guardia Civil, Guardia Republicana and Policia de Investigación Peruana (PIP). The García administration combined the three services in a national forces, but has not overcome grudges and administrative turf divisions inherent in the division. Up until the late 1980s, the police did not have specialized units for counterinsurgency operations. An infamous unit, known by its Quechua name, Sinchi, was nothing more than a grouping of recent graduates of the Mazamari training camp in the Central Sierra jungle. Sendero's tactic of assassinating policemen, frequently when off-duty or after their duty service in emergency zones, has brought severe tension on rank-and-file policemen.

The street-corner cop is poorly paid, making less than $100 a month. He has the equivalent of a secondary education, plus a year's training. Until 1985, police received only six months training.

State of Emergency

The 1979 Peruvian constitution allows the Executive to declare a state of emergency for 60 days, renewable thereafter. It suspends four constitutional guarantees: the prerequisites of a search warrant to enter a private dwelling and to make an arrest, and the freedoms of movement within the national territory and of public meeting. Under a state of emergency, the Executive may also hand over the safeguarding of public order to the Armed Forces. Indeed, there may be a secret 1963 decree which automatically hands over authority to the military. If social unrest worsens, the government may also declare a state of siege. No government has invoked this second provision. (García Sayán 1987)

However, once the government sets up a state of emergency, security forces interpret this authorization as a complete suspension of legal guarantees.

The first time the government invoked this faculty was in October, 1981. Since 1983, it has become, for all matters, permanent in Ayacucho. Both the Belaúnde and García governments have declared the whole country under a state of emergency on several occasions. By end-1989, eight departments were under state of emergency (Ayacucho, Huancavelica,

Apurímac, Junín, Cerro de Pasco, Huanuco, San Martin and Ucayalí. There are also several provinces, like metropolitan Lima and Callao.
This measure has practical implications for GSOs. Because the military has the authority to restrict free transit and public meetings, the army has interpreted this as a mandate to monitor GSOs in emergency areas (as well as human rights investigators and relief assistance by international organizations). In Ayacucho, two GSOs had their authorization to go into the countryside suspended, though both eventually regained it.
However, since early 1989, army troops have taken up positions and patrolled areas that are not under state of emergency. For instance, in southern Cajamarca and Puno, commanders say that they have authority to seek and engage guerrilla units in their area and even follow them into other military jurisdictions. This trend increased in the later half of 1989 as the armed forces had to guarantee November municipal elections. This status will continue through April general elections and the July hand-over of office.
The declaration of a state of emergency produces a subordination of civilian institutions to military authority. Although the judicial system and government supposedly continue functioning, the military commander becomes ultimate decision-maker. Because civilian elites already fear for their property and lives, they seek security in the military. This forces a recomposition of the system of prestige and power, an additional polarization between haves and have-nots. From the choice of godfathers to potential husbands for daughters, the military take priority.

Where there is more economic activity, counterinsurgency becomes a business contract with local interests. A commander provides protection in exchange for use of vehicles, provisioning and even cash payment. This practice is clear in Puno where police unit provide protection for the remaining associative enterprises (Pisoconi and Santa Rosa in Melgar province, Sollocota in Azángaro and Aricoma in Carabaya) (IDL 1990,50). In the Central Sierra, army and police have built up a relationship with mining companies. During the 1989 national mining strike, military activity was aimed at breaking the strikers' back rather than fighting off the guerrillas.
Security forces, both police and the armed forces, are rotated regularly. These duty tours vary from three months to a year. This means that they rarely have an in-depth knowledge of the zone. They view centers as outsiders, even though they may have been there 20 years. Most centers and their staffs have internalized this facet since they expect periodic brushes with the law enforcement agencies as part of "getting to know each other."

The raw recruits just want to make it through their two-year hitch in the service and then get out. Most army troops come from coastal urban areas, adding a racial and ethnic component to their relationship with the locals in the Sierra. Few officers speak Quechua. "For the officers, it's a world they don't understand and fear," says an Ayacucho GSO worker. "It is easier to lump everyone together as a suspected Senderista than start to make distinctions."
In periods of tension and conflict, the military officers and police are quick to accuse the GSOs as being troublemakers or even the legal arm and

logistical apparatus of Sendero. In their eyes, GSO projects (and even bilateral or multilateral development programs) are voluntarily or involuntarily agents of communism. Their best option, the military say, would be to leave the zone and clear the way for the army to do its dirty work without uncomfortable witnesses. The military cannot understand why foreigners (or university-educated outsiders) would want to work with backward Indians -- they have to be communists and sympathizers of Sendero.

In a cross between feudal fiefdoms and caste solidarity, local commanders have leeway in carrying out counterinsurgency strategy. An active military officer says, "The rules for respecting local authorities and human rights are in the regulations for emergency zone operations. It depends on the commanding officer and his personality to enforce them." As long as they do not break internal rules, they can improvise, from organizing sports events for local youth to dismantling all grassroots organizations which do not swear allegiance to the army. There has been only a scattering of reporting on this facet. Usually, human rights groups are able to determine which commanders are hardliners because complaints of abuses and disappearances start piling up for a specific zone. Sometimes, a "good officer" will find his way into press reports because he organizes community action programs.

Most of the corruption is petty -- using the petty cash box for purchases that are overpriced or never made (Large-scale military corruption comes from contraband and materiel purchase). However, the military top brass fears the corrupting influence of the drug trade. The commanding officer of the Upper Huallaga zone in 1984-85, General Carbajal, was drummed out of the service because of drug-related charges. In early 1990, three officers were court-martialled for drug trafficking and the regional commander of the Huallaga was relieved of his duties.

There is a structural abuse drilled into the soldiers and officers. They regard the "cholos" as second-class citizen, as guerrilla sympathizers, if not outright combatants. Other types of abuses, like torture or extrajudicial executions, require special initiative which usually depends on the commanding officer.
Anyone who wants to get ahead in his career does not take risks. The risk-takers end up like "Comandante Camion," a Marine officer who headed up the bloodiest repression in exile in Panama, but no chance to make general or president. There are few who stick out their necks on the other side of the counterinsurgency spectrum, like breaking out of the hawkish, bit conformist mold imposed by military training. "In this kind of war, it is enough not to lose to win in one's military career," says a GSO staff member who has observed the military close up.

General Alberto Arciniega, the commander of the Upper Huallaga theater of operations in 1989, is an exception which confirms the rule. He succeeded in reversing Sendero's advances in the valley through an aggressive military offensive, an outspoken political stance and an attempt to reach out to the local coca growers for support. He accomplished this reversal at the cost of human rights abuses in the zone, though less than might have

been expected due to the scale of the operations. However, since being rotated out of the command at end-1989, he has been confined to a bureaucratic post in the Ministry of Defense.

Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command and Other Paramilitary Groups

The first action of the Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command (CFR) was the assassination of Manuel Febres, the defense lawyer of Senderista leader Osmán Morote, in July, 1988. The name was taken from a young Aprista leader, president of a state company, who Sendero assassinated in August, 1987. Over the next year, further assassinations, attacks and threats were attributed to Rodrigo Franco Command. CRF offered a flag of convenience for disgruntled individuals and groups to hide behind. In Ayacucho, the army used it as a means of intimidating the local population. (Instituto de Defensa Legal 1989)

However, there was already a record of paramilitary groups, closely linked to APRA. In Puno, GSOs, the Catholic Church, parliamentarians and other organizations received attacks and threats in 1986 and 1988. The national police force, the Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General's Office have shown scarce interest in resolving most of the crimes linked to the Rodrigo Franco Command. Military sources say that some CRF incidents show access to police intelligence.
A congressional inquiry led to a minority report charging that Rodrigo Franco Command had direct links to the Ministry of Interior, the National Police Force and APRA. It also charged that the Rodrigo Franco Command was responsible for the assassination of IU deputy Eriberto Arroyo and perhaps APRA deputy Pablo Li in April 1989. The majority report shrugged off the evidence.

Although it may seem contradictory, APRA suffers from pulls from two directions. MRTA and even Sendero in some areas pull on its youth wing. The para-military formula attracts its party strong-arm elements (bufalos and defense groups), strongly influence by 40 years of anti-communism and goon tactics to keep control of popular organizations. A source close to the military says that they have identified 75 armed groups within APRA, attached to the party, government or public entities to provide supplementary protection.

Paramilitary groups constitute a threat potentially more dangerous than Sendero for many GSOs. They operate in urban areas and target individuals and organizations that might appear to have left wing sympathies, not necessary for subversive groups. These include human rights organizations, unions, regional defense fronts and grassroots organizations. They open an even wider breach in law enforcement because it encourages disgruntled military and police officers to bypass the insufficiencies of the justice system. Its actions aim to deliver messages to a broader public so available targets serve that purpose as well as true subversives.

Criminal Delinquency and Narcotrafficking

In periods of social and political upheaval, criminal activities are bound to rise, both out of the necessity to survive and through a breakdown of ethics and moral standards and of effective governance and law enforcement. In parts of the country, banditry and highway robbery have broken out. A frequently criminal practice has been extortion, using the pretext of belonging to armed groups, to demand war taxes or other payments.

Drug trafficking poses a major threat to the country. The growing of coca has been a traditional activity of Andean peasants for millennium. Due to the colonization efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, the government opened up large areas of the Andean jungle foothills. By the mid-1970s, coca growing for illegal trafficking gained a foothold and quickly expanded. By the 1985, trafficking and its criminal repercussions took on epidemic proportions, augmented by the involvement of Colombian mafia. During its deepest on-the-ground involvement, the Colombian mafia has arrayed an arsenal and manpower far above those held by either the government or insurgent forces.
Drug trafficking has concentrated in the Upper Huallaga valley where GSOs have not been active. However, it is also prevalent in the tropical valleys of the Marañon, Apurimac, Urubamba and Tambopata rivers, as well as Ene, Tambo, Perené, Pichis, and Palcazu rivers in the central Amazon. For that matter, the hardy coca plant is adaptable to all the tropical eastern slopes of the Andes and will also grow in other settings as well.

Both Sendero Luminoso and MRTA have developed working relationships with cocaine growers and the intermediaries of the Colombian mafia. The coca-growing complex in the Huallaga valley reveals a facet of Sendero's practices. The main contradiction in rural areas is the conflict between growers and purchasers of their produce. The Colombia mafias enforced their prices through armed violence. In the Huallaga valley, neither the State or a truly free market could intervene to moderate prices because the growing and merchandising of coca is illegal and penalized. Government and police authorities lost legitimacy because they were easily corrupted and colluded with the mafia. Abuses by authorities (theft and extortion) could not be appealed to the government because most coca growers engaged in an illegal activity.
Sendero, which already considers itself outside bourgeois law, stepped in to mediate this contradiction between growers and buyers by applying a superior violence. This authority, which combines a monopoly of violence and the administration of justice, also acquires the right to charge taxes for its services. What we are seeing take place in the Huallaga is the installation of a new state in its most primitive form (De Remetería 1989, 372-4).
In 1982-83, Sendero tried to enforce a similar function by closing down the Sunday fairs in Ayacucho, blocking access to urban markets. This was one of the reasons that many campesinos lost their allegiance to Sendero. They needed the market. The recourse was too extreme. In the Huallaga, Sendero found a more pragmatic, effective means of moving campesinos over to its side.

Both Sendero and MRTA have opened up new areas to coca cultivation, even imposing obligatory coca acreage on farmers and peasants who did not want to grow. This development may be due to the guerrillas' recognition that they can only maintain financial independence by guaranteeing that local residents have sufficient income to pay "war taxes" and other contributions as well as pushing the local populace outside the legal order.
This relationship with coca growing and trafficking is perhaps one of the more menacing features of the Peruvian insurgency because of its virulent nature. It is hard to conceive of Sendero spreading to Bolivia, Ecuador or Venezuela as a political phenomena. The Sendero-cocaine partnership, however, has more potential to take root in other Andean-tropical settings.
Grassroots Support Organizations in Peru
Today, there are nearly 400 promotion centers in Peru. The institutional weight and national presence of these centers has few parallels in Latin America. Only in Chile, Bolivia and Brazil do grassroots supper organization play such a prominent role.

Centers may vary over a wide range of organization and permanency. Some are small, ephemeral entities which an individual or group put together for a specific program and ends when financing runs out. Other are permanent institutions with long-term goals and the means of generating resources. Centers may also have institutional links to ecclesiastic entities, international private development agencies or independent, seeking their own funding.

Activities can span from pure academic research centers to installation of community infrastructure. Grassroots support organizations concentrate on providing programs and services in working class neighborhoods (barriadas), rural communities or specific sectors of the urban population (women, street venders, cottage industries, district and provincial municipal governments). GSOs usually work within limited geographic territory -- a shantytown, a campesino community or a valley -- identifying underprivileged groups and helping to elaborate survival strategies. Some GSOs have centered their work on aiding broader organizations (union federations, campesino organizations and the like, known in Peru as gremios) to strengthen their positions before a State with strong authoritarian traits. Others centers concentrate on specific activities, like human rights, communication, education or health. Several of the larger centers combine all these aspects in their programs.

In general, GSOs try to reach low-income, underprivileged groups with varying degrees of organization. However, these target groups do not represent the "poorest of the poor" in Peru. They have acquired resources and organization for improving their own conditions. The GSOs try to help them in using these advantages better. These target groups are often called beneficiaries, an unfortunate term. They make contributions in time and effort which surpass the monetary investment of donor agencies and centers. In this report, we will refer to them as local partners.

The strongest GSOs can influence regional or national politics through dialogue with government officials, institutions and local constituencies.

The Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) in Piura and the Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas in Cusco are examples of regional influence. DESCO-Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participacion (CEDEP), the Centro de Investigación, Educacion y Desarrollo (CIED), the Centro de Información y Desarrollo Integral de Autogestión (CIDIAG) and the Fundación para el Desarrollo Nacional (FDN) are examples of Lima-based institutions that have acquired a national weight and influence. (Carroll and others 1989)

Financing for GSO activities comes from international sources, mainly European and North American donor agencies. Most funding is for one to three years. A few sources provide long-term funding. There are about 50 international donating agencies which provide between $6-8 million a year in funding for 1984 (Padron 1988, 30). By 1987, this total rose to $24.4 million, according to the Instituto de Planificación Nacional. This represented 15 percent of international technical cooperation to Peru that year. (Boutrou 1989, 14)

The growth of GSOs into a national institutional force with its own interests and goals has been due to Peru's peculiar development over the past three decades. In 1968, the armed forces under General Juan Velasco Alvarado overthrew the government of President Fernando Belaúnde. For the next 12 years, military rule shaped the early experience of GSOs, their staff and constituencies. The Velasco regime broke many stereotypes about Latin American military regimes. It carried out a series of major reforms, the most important being a far-reaching agrarian reform. In 1975, the military regime, then, under General Francisco Morales Bermúdez began to pull back from the regime's most radical positions. It also dismantled or reduced public entities aimed at social and economic reform. After a massive protest strike in July, 1977, protesting prices increases and other economic measures, the military began a political process to hand over power to a civilian government.

There were probably no more than 30-40 centers before 1977 (Padrón 1988, 46). Three years later, a group of centers founded the Asociación Nacional de Centros (ANC) as a coordinating body.

There were several factors which influenced the growth of GSOs during this initial period. First, the Catholic Church hierarchy began acting on the doctrinal innovations set down in the Vatican Council II in 1962-5 and the Medellín (Colombia) conference in 1968 to bring church rites and practices into step with the times. This also meant that the Church was no longer a secure pillar of the status quo. In fact, the Catholic Church played a leading role in setting up a tradition of independent development programs even in the 1950s (Padron 1988, 46). Theology of Liberation and the teachings of Paolo Freire increased popular education efforts. Second, the national universities set up "social projection" programs to give practical application of their learning experience. These contacts gradually changed from efforts to make the university present in the community to more permanent goal of promotion. As the universities lost public funding, many of groups or individuals found ways of continuing their work. Third, Cooperación Popular

under the Belaúnde government and the Sistema Nacional de la Movilización Social (SINAMOS) under Velasco gave practical experience with development work. The Velasco regime's reforms created or coalesced new grassroots organizations, like neighborhood development groups, peasant communities, cooperatives, agrarian leagues and the labor community (a profit-sharing and co-management scheme for industry, mining and other companies). These three factors gave centers a generational characteristic, as well as a common political, ideological and social experience.(Carroll and others, 1990) They also marked the general left wing character to GSOs and centers. This sentiment would eventually mature into a tacit or explicit support for Izquierda Unida (IU), the left wing coalition founded in September, 1980.

The GSOs and other centers have, in turn, influenced the formation of the nationalist Marxist left. Many of their staff played a key role in overcoming the left's initial reticence to accept small-scale development programs as more than reformist patches to the capitalist system. They led the way to providing concrete, pragmatic solutions to local problems, generating more respect for grassroots organizations and providing employment to left wing militants.

During this same period, these generation of politically and socially motivated groups and individuals met up with another social phenomenon. During the 1960s and 1970s, grassroots organizations of many kinds bloomed in Peru. Although some organizations, like campesino communities, had existed for centuries, others emerged in the new marginal urban areas, many as concrete responses to the needs of the inhabitants. In the late 1970s, the category of barriada -- low-income neighborhood starting as a land seizure by homeless squatters, frequently migrants -- came to take its place alongside more traditional social groups, like peasants, students and workers. For instance, soup kitchens, mothers' clubs and street vendor guilds did not exist before 1975. It was an opportunity that opened virgin ground for urban and rural development work. Grassroots organizations and their grew faster and broader than the GSOs' capacity to meet them (Velarde 1988, 194).

GSOs became a new way of linking up political and methodological preoccupations with local communities, organizations and the popular movement in Peru. Political activists came out of their clandestine hidings and took public roles in the centers, linking up with the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, the new superior levels of organization, political parties or the emerging social groups. It would eventually lead to an effort to rethink the country and its future.

The Democratic Opening

In 1980, Peru returned to civilian rule. President Fernando Belaúnde and Acción Popular (AP), with junior partner the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), shifted government policy towards a more market-oriented, liberal economic policy. The government, however, still maintained a populist approach on many issues. Three major social and political changes marked this period. First, subversive violence began in Ayacucho, disconcerting the Belaúnde administration. Second, in 1982, agrarian federations staged a

national protest strike against the Belaúnde administration's policies on land ownership, foodstuff pricing and agricultural credit for the first time in Peru's history. In 1983, the Latin American debt crisis rocked Peru, throwing the government's economic policy into inconsistency. These three factors led to a dramatic decline in economic growth and living standards. Within this context, GSOs were likely to be sucked into increasingly contentious situations, specially given the implicit and explicit commitments in their programs.

The first attack against a GSO took place in Puno. In August, 1981, a group of 40 masked men attacked the headquarters of the Instituto de Educación Rural (IER) Palermo located at an experimental farm outside the town of Juli. After terrorizing five women religious and a priest present, the group broke windows, threw a homemade bomb into the residence, and ransacked the Institute's offices. A month later, a bomb exploded at the Juli Prelature headquarters and home of the Maryknoll prelate Albert Koenigsknecht. Near the door of the Prelature offices, police found a letter threatening to assassinate all missionary personnel of the Prelature, if they didn't abandon their work and leave the area immediately. Campesino communities and organizations from throughout the area again expressed their outrage through communiques and radio announcements.

The local church leaders had a hard time convincing outsiders that the attacks came from a group called Sendero Luminoso. Apparently, Sendero had enlisted the support of a local Maoist splinter group in setting up its first cells. However, an alternative explanation was that local power groups, deeply hostile to the progressive Puno church, were behind some of the harassing action. Sur-Andino bishops said that these rural power elite frequently used the excuse of subversive violence to take reprisals against reform-oriented groups in the region. Church authorities now lean towards the Sendero option. Either way, proactive development work had stirred up a violent response (Judd 1987, 167-9).

However, during the Belaúnde period, most subversive activity was concentrated in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac departments, a region of secular poverty and relative isolation.

In mid-1982, the agricultural extension center of Allpachaka, run by the University of Huamanga, suffered an attack by Sendero. The incident provoked the first retreat of GSOs from the most distant part of the Ayacucho countryside. (See Section Three: Case Studies for a more detailed account of this incident).

In January, 1983, President Belaúnde authorized the armed forces to take over control of Ayacucho. This escalation in the counterinsurgency effort introduced a semi-autonomous element into the complex constellation of forces vying for the upper hand in the Central Sierra conflict zone. However, the Belaúnde administration never gave the armed forces a clear mandate to carry out its duties, a precise draft of counterinsurgency policy or the resources to attain its objectives.

This period also opened up a common experience among centers operating in areas of conflict: security forces frequently see them and their staff as outsiders, political provocateurs and, worst, likely ringleaders of subversive activities.

In May, 1983, hooded army troops broke into the house of Jaime Urrutia, a university professor and the director of the Instituto de Estudios Rurales José Maria Arguedas in Ayacucho, and detained him for 14 days. They held him in the military garrison (Los Cabitos) and later transferred him to the investigative police station. The military worked under the assumption that the Senderista insurrection was too well done to be the inspiration of the local population. There had to be foreign involvement. Urrutia had raised suspicions because foreigners, mainly journalists, frequently visited his house at odd hours. The military tortured him as part of their interrogation. Because of the immediate response of foreign journalists, the University of Huamanga and human rights organizations in Lima, security forces released Urrutia with no further explanation for the detention.

A similar incident took place in Andahuaylas province, Apurímac. The Centro de Investigación y Capacitación Campesina (CICCA) had four employees detained and tortured for three days. The military and police in the zone were convinced that CICCA was aiding and abetting Sendero in the zone, especially through its legal aid and training activities with campesinos. After the release of the workers, CICCA withdrew from the province after the incident.

In June and July, 1983, Belaunde accused "scientific or humanitarian institutions with pompous names" of serving as conduits for funds to Sendero and other subversive groups. They were also responsible for spreading foreign ideologies. (DESCO 1989, 401-3) Several research centers had their books examined by the fiscal police. The government never produced proof to back up these accusations. The Ministry of Interior also frequently asked GSO directors to clarify their activities.

Towards the end of the Belaúnde term, a serious incident involving the Centro de Investigación y Promoción Amazónica (CIPA) took place in Lagunas, Yurimaguas (Loreto). In June, 1985, a Senderista cell started up guerrilla operations. The police wiped out the column quickly. Authorities accused three CIPA staff members of being the masterminds behind the guerrillas. The CIPA had recently relocated the work group from the Tambo river region in Junín, where they had felt pressured by increasing presence of Sendero and security forces. One CIPA staff member was Daniel Rodríguez, son of Army General Leonidas Rodríguez who had ordered in troops to crush a Lima police mutiny in February, 1974. The police held a special grudge against him. All three staffers were subjected to physical and psychological abuse and torture. CIPA mustered a campaign to save its workers from extended court proceedings. Finally, charges were dismissed. No charges were brought against the police officers who had committed abuses and torture.

Towards the end of the Belaúnde administration, Sendero began to spread its guerrilla activities outside of the Ayacucho region. Parts of Cerro de Pasco and Huanuco came under emergency military control.

Perhaps, the most important development for GSOs during the Belaunde period was the opening to new democratic institutions. Freely elected district and provincial municipal governments created new arenas for cooperation between emerging political forces and centers. In 1980 and more so in 1983, GSOs established agreements with local governments, mainly headed by Izquierda Unida mayors, to provide advice and programs for grassroots survival groups, like mothers' clubs, soup kitchens and street venders. GSO staff members were elected as councilmen and served as advisors to IU municipal governments.

The Dusk of Populism

In 1985, President Alan García and the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) won the general elections. The general political panorama lurched to the left. The Peruvian electorate gave 70 percent of their votes to APRA and the IU. Garcia made overtures to the Peruvian intelligentsia, receiving the tacit support of several centers and explicit cooperation from individual members. Public administration also attracted GSO professionals to help draft and put into action a new set of policies and programs.

García's aggressive, populist approach during his first three years posed serious problems for many centers because the president launched proposals that came right out of the GSOs' script. It threw many centers and Izquierda Unida itself off balance. Microregional development schemes, agrarian credit and programs for cheap inputs and farming equipment, temporary employment programs for communal works were among the ideas incorporated into the government repertoire. Other proposals, like public health, never got past the planning stage. In a sense, many GSOs were basing their small-scale development programs on a perennial deficiency of the Peruvian state, assuming responsibilities that, under normal conditions, corresponded to normal government activities. If the State regained viability (as seemed initially possible in 1986-87), then the GSOs would be superfluous.

However, the García administration suffered from a Jekyll-and-Hyde personality. While García and his closest collaborators fell within the political spectrum shared by GSOs, APRA's party and local leadership was more conservative, leading to continued brushes with centers. APRA wanted the undisputed allegiance of grassroots organizations. Their corporativist intentions and appetites required a realignment of grassroots organizations with the State in its local manifestation, condensed in the role of the party. Local authorities and party officials frequently conditioned assistance programs on political subservience. In May, 1986, Aprista Deputy Rómulo León Alegría accused 75 research and promotion centers of being fronts for instigating armed struggle, though he directed most attacks against the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM), in IU's radical wing. (DESCO 1989, 460-1) A congressional investigation started, but never drafted findings. These accusations came at a highly troubled period

in Puno when peasants, with the backing of the Sur-Andino Catholic Church, IU parties and several centers, were seizing land from inefficient agrarian cooperatives.

In 1988, the ANC counted 360 centers in the country, of which 103 were members of the organization. There were six regional assemblies, but few of them met regularly. (ANC 1988, 4)

In September, 1988, the García administration was no longer able to sustain its risky economic policy of indiscriminate subsidy, patronage and deficit spending. A new economic policy led to a recession and hyperinflation. Inflation went from 63 percent in 1986 and 114 percent in 1987 to 1,722 percent in 1988 and 2,775 percent in 1989. This introduced huge price distortions into the economy, especially in the exchange between urban and rural producers and consumers.

Regional protest strikes mainly organized by farmers and peasants showed an increased disconformity in the countryside. Agrarian strikes lasting up to a month shook Puno, Cusco, Pucallpa, Huaraz and San Martin. GSOs often found themselves involved in their protests, as advisors to peasant federations, as intermediaries to the government and as communication channels since several centers had radio programs. The government frequently regarded the most outspoken, action-oriented centers as instigators of the conflicts.

In February, 1989, police raided the offices of the Instituto de Investigación y Apoyo al Desarrollo de Ucayalí (IIADO), causing damages. The striking agrarian federation and Lima politicians had used its offices as a strike headquarters. The center overstepped its commitment to peasants because it lost control of its intervention in the strike and did not draw a clear line between support and activism, development experts say.

Among other problems, the State had minimal funds for investment. In some areas, like Cusco, the centers probably handled more funds than the government.(Haudry 1990, 253) The political instability of the Aprista government added another perturbing factor for GSOs trying to work in coordination with the State. Constant changes in functionaries, declining resources, policy voids, and political rivalries made the government close to inert. There were also widespread signs of corruption from the top to the bottom of the government. By raising awareness and strengthening grassroots organizations, the GSOs seemed to be rallying the opposition against the government and making them more critical. GSOs programs were also a point of comparison with the deficiencies of the state programs (Carroll and others 1989).

The State pulled back on its presence because it practically had no operating or investment funds, as well as the threat from subversive violence. Bilateral and multinational programs beat a retreat from many areas. For instance, in the Pucallpa area of the Amazon jungle, five bilateral programs suspended or withdrew their programs in 1989. This retreat meant that Peruvian GSOs were left alone to face the threat.

Rural Development as a Military Target

The economic upheaval also kicked off a major escalation of political violence. It began to force GSOs and other development programs to withdraw from the countryside. Sendero's presence bore down on the spine of the Andes, from the northern pivot of Huamachuco-Cajabamba (La Libertad and Cajamarca departments) to the highland provinces of Cusco. In Puno, Sendero already had played off a conflict between peasants and cooperatives. (See Section Three for a more detailed account of Puno) Sendero also moved into the Amazon region, mainly in the Upper Huallaga valley. It linked up with the social dynamics set off by the cocaine drug trade. Another subversive group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, also set up its guerrilla actions.

Perhaps, the most striking retreat of state authority, security forces and centers took place in Junín in early 1989. The regional centers thought there was no need to worry. They argued that the zone was different from the subsistence campesinos of the Ayacucho emergency zone. It was a "point economy." They cited the market-wise campesinos as examples of the healthy confluence of Indian, mestizo and Creole racial currents. Campesinos had a long history of cultural resistance and struggle to recover their land, requiring strong communal and intra-communal organization. The associative enterprises of the zone were prosperous, frequently cited as examples of how the military's agrarian reform had succeeded if the right conditions were present. (Manrique 1989, Sánchez 1989)

Because Junín is located next to Huancavelica and Ayacucho, Sendero had a presence in the zone, but most locals explained this as a spillover from the emergency zone and the need to pass through the zone to move farther north. Many staff members thought that Sendero would not attack their projects and programs because they were on the "right side," working to improve living conditions and crop yields of the peasants.

There were already signs that Sendero was escalating its presence. Centers also began receiving warnings and threats to stay out of specific areas of the highlands. In June, 1988, Sendero killed two staff members of a subcontractor of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). One was an American citizen. (Caretas, June 20, 1988). The centers rationalized this attack because of the U.S. association and specific practices of the work team. In August, 1988, Sendero raided and destroyed a program at Jarpa, in the highlands above Huancayo, run by Jesuits priests. The centers shrugged off the incident because the Jarpa program was located in a strategical point of the high plateau. Another center lost a vehicle because Sendero stole it to use it as a carbomb. An additional complication was that most of the Junín centers had split off from a larger center, leaving a latent pool of distrust among the centers, an unwillingness to share information and resistance to ceding terrain to rival centers.

In late November, 1988, Sendero's escalation in activities and tactics forced the government to place the zone under state of emergency and send in army troops. Even that did not press centers into action. However, when Sendero abducted and assassinated Manuel Soto of the Centro de

Investigación Campesina y Educación Popular (CICEP) and Victor Lozano, a campesino leader of Canicapo, in January, 1989, the perception changed immediately. Soto was on the ANC board. Soto and the local campesino federation had been spearheading a political proposal to redistribute the land monopolized by associative enterprises of the zone. The restructuring initiative had the backing of PUM, trying to apply a strategy that had proved successful in Puno. By mid-year, of the fourteen centers in the zone, four remained.

A Lima research center leveled the following criticism against Junín GSOs during this period: "The GSOs that play an important role of popular support and promotion showed discoordination, inter-institutional jealousy and lack of new, clear perspectives in their work in the emergency or political violence zones, where they necessarily should change their roles of behavior and action." (Democracia y Socialismo 1989, 24)

Sendero was not only attacking military and political targets. It was disputing control of the region with MRTA. There were several armed clashes between columns, as well as fights in the university. The confrontation was present in other areas (the Upper Huallaga and Lima).

Elsewhere, the alarm had sounded for other GSOs. In December, 1988, Sendero killed two foreign staff members and a Peruvian worker of the Centro Internacional de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Agrícola (CICDA), a French development promotion center which operates in Peru under the norms of international technical cooperation. The incident took place in Haquira, Apurímac department. In addition to the three CICDA workers plus two other civilians killed in the incident, another 50 people were killed in the zone within a month. These were lieutenant governors, campesino leaders and cattle thieves. Sendero slit their throats.

The Senderista column leaders spoke against the centers, as "lackeys of Yankee and social imperialism." The reason for the killings was that Sendero had entered into the Third Stage, which meant that outside assistance would be forced out of the countryside. CICDA had never received threats to leave the community or other warnings. The three staff members were not even offered the sham of a "people's trial." The Senderistas said that campesino organizations not aligned with SL would also be targets of reprisals. The language was not ideological and the leader tried to speak down to the campesino mentality.

A CICDA official says there were three main reasons for the attack against CICDA staffers. The institution was highly visible, but isolated in a zone that had strategic value for Sendero. Second, two of the field staff were French. Third, it associated itself with the proposal to organize rondas campesinas. This last point was the "straw which broke the camel's back." "It was an alternative which clashed directly with Sendero's own proposal for the zone."

CICDA decided to close down its operations in the southern Andes, including well-established programs in La Union and Condesuyo provinces (Arequipa), Chumbivilcas province (Cusco) and a new program in Espinar

(Cusco), as well as Haquira. It transferred as many programs as possible to the local partners and other centers in the region. Its staff dropped from 40-50 to five, all based in Lima.

In response to this increased menace against multilateral, bilateral and grassroots development efforts in the conflict zones, the García administration failed to show even the minimum of courtesy, much less the wish to draft guidelines or strategies. It signaled foreign missions and their governments that it did not care about the risk of foreign field staffs or the viability of development programs.

In May, 1989, Sendero attacked the installations of Instituto de Educación Rural Waqrani, a Catholic Church-run center in Puno (See Section Three: Case Studies for a more detailed account). Two months later, another Senderista column attacked and looted the installations of the Instituto de Desarrollo del Medio Ambiente (IDMA) in Ambo, Huanuco, burning its tractors and installations and left a message that heavy machinery could not be used in the future. Within two months, the IDMA redrafted its program, pulling back its programs from the high reaches of the mountains, housing its staff in a nearby town but continued its presence in the zone.

In Lima and other major cities, centers working with urban programs found themselves confronted with the same issue. In mid-1989, El Diario published a series of articles attacking centers, staff members and local partners by name.

During late 1989 and early 1990, the election campaigns for municipal, regional, legislative and presidential races led most GSOs to cut back their activities and keep a low profile. In June, 1990, however, the Centro de Desarrollo y Participacion (CEDEP) had two staff members, a consultant and a local livestock owner killed in Puno. They had gone to Melgar province to purchase alpaca herds for their program in Ancash department. The incident seems to be a case of "the wrong place at the wrong time," crossing with a Senderista column near the town of Ñuñoa. CEDEP does not have any operations in Puno so it is unlikely that Sendero would have targeted the CEDEP staff members.

For three years running (1987, 1988 and 1989), Peru had the privilege of topping the list of countries where forced disappearances have been denounced internationally. In 1990, 300 people disappeared. In March, 1990, human rights organizations were attacked by right wing paramilitary squads. Amnesty International and the Andean Commission of Jurists were both hit. The International Red Cross, which provides relief assistance in emergency zones, for forced migrants due to internal conflicts and in prisons, was also bombed. The International Red Cross has been refused permission to work in Ayacucho on several occasions.

These trends shook Peruvian centers to their core. Efforts to join forces had been sporadic. The ANC grew substantially, in part as a mediator with the government to defuse misunderstandings and disputes over the role of GSOs. In August, 1989, a group of 21 organizations plus the ANC set up

InterCentros to pool their resources and talents in dealing with specific themes, among them, political violence. One of the ANC's handicaps is that it is hard for it to draft a shared policy to confront the crisis because of its democratic nature. Each center, no matters its size, importance, type of programs, locations and political leanings, has one vote and an equal say in the running of the ANC. Its strength is in its representativity of a broad cross-section of centers. InterCentros is based on the stature of its associates, among the elite of the independent research centers, university centers and grassroots support organizations. Its objective is to make an impact on state policy.

GSO leaders say that there were increasing reports in 1989 that donor agencies began to cut back or stop their support of Peruvian GSOs due to the political upheaval and the difficulty in monitoring programs.

By the end of the García period, the political climate had changed dramatically. Novelist Mario Vargas Llosa emerged as the right-center presidential candidate. An alliance forged between his Libertad Movement, AP and PPC seemed sure to win in general elections. Vargas Llosa promised a "revolution of modernization" based on market-oriented economic policies, a drastic cutback of bureaucracy and state intervention in the economy and a more receptive approach to foreign investment and the international financial community.

However, the aggressive -- and, at times, arrogant -- campaign by Vargas Llosa and his allies led to a voter backlash, combined with a sanction of all political parties. APRA had shrunk to its die-hard supporters, still about 20 percent of the electorate. IU had divided into two blocks, a radical faction with the old name and a more moderate alliance rallied around the presidential candidacy of Alfonso Barrantes (Movimiento de Izquierda Socialista). This split had a impact on promotion centers because GSOs had worked with an IU mystique. The beneficiary of this political shift was a wildcard presidential candidate, Alberto Fujimori and his Cambio 90 movement. In a presidential runoff with Vargas Llosa in early June, Fujimori won.

This political surprise was the most visible sign of a breakdown of predictable formulas for Peru. The existence of five regional governments (as of January, 1990) and the setting up of seven more following April, 1990 regional elections opened possibilities for new types of cooperative between centers and local governments, as well as a potential for administrative chaos and bankrupt services.

Summing Up Three Decades

We should keep in mind several trends among GSOs over the past two decades. Generally, the centers' staff supports the left, but not a particular party. Because excessive party lines could create internal conflicts, centers created an ethos in which the common cause was the left and Izquierda Unida, but not a party. However, this ethos was hurt by the buildup to the 1990 general elections campaign and the temptation to use resources to favor one side or another in the power struggle within IU. The split

between IU and Izquierda Socialista left centers in the lurch because they found the political split latent within them.

However, it should also be noted that the rise in political violence has erased much of the petty rivalries among centers and their staffs. The external threat from Sendero Luminoso has made it possible for coordination, pooling of information and joint analysis which would have been inconceivable 10 years ago.

The apparent left wing monopoly of GSOs and other centers was not as complete as sometimes appeared. Grassroots organizations did not care about the ideological or program differences between the two left wing groups and sought another political option, voting for Alberto Fujimori and Cambio 90. Aside from programs backed by Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical churches, there was a small, growing group of centers associated with the center-right. The Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Habitat Peru Siglo XXI, Fundación Ulloa, Acción Comunitaria del Peru and ADIM came into existence in the 1980s. They are generally linked to American financing, like Agency for International Development, PACT, Acción-AITEC and the Inter-American Foundation (Carroll and others, 1990). This trend emerged out of the recognition that the right-center needed to recapture an intellectual space which had been a virtual monopoly of the left wing intelligentsia. The effort was a success. Where the right-center groups have lagged is working with grassroots organizations. During the runoff election between Vargas Llosa and Fujimori, FREDEMO's attempt to project a social program in marginal areas came off as lame and opportunistic. An exception is Violeta Correa, the wife of former president Fernando Belaúnde, who works with shantytown communal kitchens, continuing a program that began as an outgrowth of her role as First Lady. Another interesting ramification is that several of these centers have started working with Peruvian funding from Peruvian corporations, foundations and private donations, thus opening the prospect of reducing the dependency on foreign financing for some centers.

Perhaps more important than the political ramifications of the centers has been their evolution into institutions in their own right, independent of their local partners, donor agencies and parties. The original proposals for a radical change in Peruvian society (with evident political connotations and implicit party options) have given way to positions more knowledgeable of the complexities of government and program execution. This is a sign of maturity, but also holds the risk of missing the real objectives of their programs. Self-perpetuation of the institutions may take precedent over effective development of grassroots organizations.

During the transition period leading up to the handover of power to Fujimori, the staff of many centers contributed to rounding out Fujimori's policies and programs. For the first time, perhaps, the government-elect saw that centers had experience, proposals and thinking to be used. Because Fujimori designated technology as one of his campaign planks, there is a natural opening for more collaboration, especially since centers with specialized programs have created networks and coordinating committees which may become active participants in the dialogue between

government and sectorial interests (micro- and small businesses, farmers and peasants). In his first cabinet, Fujimori appointed four ministers (Guido Pennano in Industry, Carlos Amat y Leon in Agriculture, Fernando Sánchez Albavera in Energy and Mines and Gloria Helfer in Education) with ample experience working in centers. With the drastic economic adjustment program executed by the Fujimori administration, the government called on GSOs to aid in putting together a social emergency program to get relief assistance to the most impoverished sectors to guarantee their survival.

Centers have also paid innovative roles in modernizing thinking about development. They have played a significant role in devising, testing and reformulating new strategies in the countryside and in urban areas. For instance, the reassessing of Andean agricultural techniques have, in part, been due to centers' critique of modern agricultural processes in the Andes and a rescuing and revaluation of the campesinos' traditional methods. They have also inserted a series of new criteria, such as ecology, into rural development.

Another contribution that has not received attention is as a training ground for a new talent pool. In the past year, in which some foreign donor agencies have shifted their rural development emphasis from Peru to Ecuador and Bolivia where explicit political violence is not a variable, donor agencies have recruited experienced Peruvian staff to man and direct their programs. Peru has been a manpower resource for alternative rural and urban development in marginal areas.

Over this past decade, the centers have generally struggled to maintain their work in the conflict zones, as long as possible. They have found the means of carrying on with their work. Yet this resistance has frequently meant stubbornly digging in their heals and not carrying out an in-depth criticism of their work and roles.

The response of grassroots support organizations has been varied. Some of the more introverted GSOs have withdrawn into shock and confusion. The main reaction has been to take precautionary measures and shift into a defensive position to weather out the storm. This fits more neatly into the general situation of uncertainty and lack of horizons. A third group of centers takes a more aggressive stand. It says that centers and the rest of civilian society cannot remain passive in this dispute. The centers have to convince their local partners that their lives, communities, accomplishments and projects are at stake, and they have to launch into more affirmative action.

Each of these approaches has its handicaps and faults, though it may be an honest appraisal of the center's resources, commitment and circumstances. The cautious middle ground may be more apt to question their framework for rural development and the role of local partners. This may be full of hesitation and vacillation. The more aggressive line is more prepared to stand its ground, based on political commitment, but less prone to ask questions about its methods.

As pointed out by Haudry (1990, 254-272), grassroots support organizations are not really dealing in "development." Development in its broadest sense requires long-term government policy stability, public investment and other factors. GSOs and even most government programs are small-scale investment programs. They are laboratories or pilot projects to open new horizons for grassroots development. These experiments are free for any institution, public or private, Peruvian or foreign, to draw on for more ambitious endeavors. For that reason, it is extremely important for GSOs to leave footprints where they have tread. The avalanche of violence threatens to whip out their marks across wide expanses of Peru.

The issues of development in Peru are not a technological-productive knot. Rather, they are political and social. The question is how to make vast sectors of the population active participants in their destiny. The spiral of violence set off by Sendero Luminoso and accelerated by the blind response of Peruvian security forces and other forces has realigned the country. A veteran advisor calls it an "axis of war." Until GSOs and Peruvian society as a whole understand that this axis of war requires a critical reassessment of development programs, democracy, popular participation and government representation , the efforts to alleviate the vast stocks of poverty and marginalization will yield meager fruit.

Section Three

Two Case Studies

We have chosen the guerrilla attacks against the Allpachaka agricultural station in Ayacucho in 1982 and the IER Waqrani rural development program in Puno in 1989. There are intriguing parallels between the two case studies. Both were symbols of regional demands for development. Both had the backing of institutions with representativity: in the first case, the University of Huamanga and, in the second case, the Sur-Andino Church. Both were attempts to produce change in the most impoverished, isolated regions of the country. The two cases, however, differ on the crucial issue of the means through which they aimed to attain their goals. We also try to show that although the aggression came from Sendero, there was another side to the conflict, the hostility from security forces and regional entrenched interests which preconditioned the attacks.

We have included detailed accounts of the antecedents, attacks and aftermaths because news information at the time was scarce and frequently incorrect. At time, Lima media may intentionally distorted reports for political purposes or simply ignore them. These accounts frequently end up incorporated into general evaluations, especially when analysts fail to filter the raw information.

We feel that those concerned about political violence should not see it as an abstract phenomenon. Death and destruction affect concrete communities, institutions and individuals. The different manners of responding to the crisis are also telling of methodology and institutional nature of the participants.

However, we should be careful of seeking overly sophisticated explanations for Sendero or the military's aggressions. Some of the fine points of this analysis may be mere coincidence or superficial features. The risk is that

GSO staff, donor agencies and others may use this analysis as a means of arguing that Sendero will never attack them. As stated elsewhere, Sendero needs little justification to strike at outsiders or power figures when it claims its preeminence in a zone.

1. 1. Ayacucho: Allpachaka Emptying the Countryside

The experimental station at Allpachaka was the first case in which Sendero took reprisals against a center devoted to agricultural investigation and extension work. It was also part of the National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga, closely linked to the founding and evolution of Sendero Luminoso. Since then, Sendero has attacked other university research centers: the Chuquibambilla extension center in Melgar province, Puno and the La Raya stations (belonging to the universities of San Marcos and Altiplano-Puno), Secuani province (Cusco), the San Marcos tropical research facilities in Pucallpa (Ucayalí) and the International Potato Center's installations in Huancayo (Junín). Sendero has also hit at other research centers associated with universities in Lima.

As a prominent Peruvian social scientist who knew Guzmán and his respect of higher learning in the 1960s asked why an insurgent group should try to destroy a pool of valuable information, part of universal knowledge that does not have political colors? Why should its actions also slaughter "capitalist cows," destroy seedbanks and burn down schools built over decades of work on the wind-swept plateau of Allpachaka and other remote zones?

This attack baffled many and led a foreign analyst to write: "Ironically, the University of Huamanga's experimental farm has a good record for orienting its research towards the needs of the local peasantry and was by no means working solely to the benefit of medium-scale landlords, as happens with other universities in Peru." (Taylor 1983, 21) However, there were elements in the Allpachaka program and the broader context which allow us to understand the incident more adequately.
The National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga set up the Allpachaka agricultural center in 1965. More than 20 hacienda owners offered their estates to the university in hopes of avoiding being affected by the 1964 Agrarian Reform. (Díaz Martínez, 1985, 35) For decades, the Ayacucho countryside had been in decline, with migration and falling productivity as a constant. The experimental station was meant to inject agricultural research new technologies and forms of application and peasant extension into this backward environment. Assistance and funding came from the Swiss Technical Cooperation, the World University Service, the Dutch government, the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Institute of Andean Crops.

The experimental farm lies 72 kilometers south of the city of Ayacucho, at an altitude of 3,580-4,200 meters above sea level. It has 1,588 hectares of land. Research covered studies of soil, pastures and livestock, Andean crops (potatoes, mashua, oca and olluco) and seed banks. The university had a second experimental farm in Huayapampa, a few kilometers outside

of the town. A third center, proposed for the jungle foothills of the Apurimac river valley, never got past the planning phase. (UNSCH 1977, 94-8) The idea was to give students, professors and investigators practical experience and research opportunities in the three ecological zones of Ayacucho -- the puna, the Quechua valley bottoms and the jungle valley. Conceptually, this program complemented with the university's mandate to turn out "rural engineers" and other professionals who would have the necessary skills to aid in the transition from a rural backwater to a modern, progressive society.

The agricultural research and extension program was the brainchild of the rector, Efrain Morote Best, one of the individuals who shaped the university. He came to represent the cosmopolitan, educated provincial elite in the university and the community, linked up with Lima intellectual circuits. He found himself pitted against the other leading figure on campus and in town, Abimael Guzmán. He represented a more political line of thinking, strongly influenced by the Maoism in vogue in university circles at the time. This feud would determine public discussion and the alliances of power which revolved around the university and its outreach efforts for the next two decades. It also marked the political birthright of the Allpachaka project -- it was the child of the anti-Guzmán block. After Morote Best left the rectorship in 1968, the university administration fell into Guzmán's control. Between 1970 and 1975, this rivalry, though veiled behind other issues, came to a head. The dispute was mainly about of the Guzmán clique's practices in controlling university administration, but had other ramifications. While anti-Guzmán allies criticized hiring practices and the allotting of the cafeteria and housing quotas according to party allegiance, the Senderista faction counterattacked by criticizing the Allpachaka program.

The Guzmán faction's criticisms were: that Allpachaka was not functioning as an educational center because students visited the center briefly and did not get involved in concrete activities; it was not making serious effort to spread knowledge and research among the surrounding communities; the peasants did not accept the research and technical proposals in their farming practices. Antonio Díaz Martínez (1985, 37), an agronomist and leading spokesperson for the faction, charged that Allpachaka was following the path of the Prussian Junker class towards capitalism and an enclave of imperialism in the Andes.
Díaz Martínez made a counterproposal for developing Allpachaka. It called for a collective management of the workers' holdings, including 10 hectares of collectively farmed fields, unified communal herds and a model village, emphasizing the ayni and minka Andean communal work systems (Díaz Martínez 1985, 205-8). Although the proposal manifested a concern for the wellbeing of the workers and surrounding communities, it did not go beyond paternalism and an idealized concept of the Ayacucho campesino community.

In response to some of the criticism, the University under a new administration without participation of the Guzmán faction set up a Centro de Capacitación Campesina (Peasant Training Center, CCC) in 1975. The program marked a new tack for standard university practices and a

reassessment of popular education and rural development programs in the region. From 1977 to 1982, with the assistance of two Dutch development advisors, the CCC worked with peasant communities in the Pampas river valley and the high pasturelands above it. Sendero cited the presence of the two Dutch advisors as additional proof of the capitalist and imperialist penetration hidden in the Allpachaka program.

The social setting

The presence of Allpachaka experimental station had consequences which went beyond its mandate of agricultural research and extension. The university purchased the Allpachaka hacienda from the Capeletti family. With the land, the university also inherited 16 feudatarios (sharecroppers) and their families. They lived on the hacienda, working the land in exchange for small individual plots. Instead of expelling the serfs from the land, the university placed them on its payrolls as workers. Eventually, the former serfs joined the university union and received other privileges, like guaranteed employment or studies for their children in the university.
The university provided other improvements. A bilingual school started functioning on the experimental farm, first for the primary grades and, later, incorporating secondary grades. It had four full-time teachers supplied by the university. The university also set up a medical post with a health promoter, nurse and visiting doctor. These services were also available to the surrounding communities. In comparison, the CCC staff surveyed 16 peasant communities in the Pampas river valley and found that 14 had primary schools, two sanitary posts, one potable water, five road access. None of the communities had sewage disposal, electricity or secondary schools (Gianotten and others 1987, 216).

The workers maintained their right to cultivate their individual plots of land with the advantage of improved seeds, fertilizers, herbicides and farm equipment supplied by the university. They also grazed their livestock on the station land. The peasant communities around Allpachaka were moving away from the traditional communal system of cultivation and rotation of the land. This process, called parcelization, means the breaking up of land into individual holdings and a stronger dependency on urban markets. The Allpachaka workers began buying land around the station.

These advantages soon began to differentiate the former serfs from the surrounding peasant communities. By 1970, a Sunday market functioned at Allpachaka. The workers were the merchants, buying the local produce and selling urban consumer goods to the peasants, serving as the intermediaries between the countryside and the Huamanga market. By the late 1970s, the Allpachaka workers had incomes which averaged six to seven times more than peasants from the surrounding communities. They started buying up land outside the experimental farm. They sought and received positions of prestige in the religious processions and other festivities which play an important role in Andean culture. The young women of neighboring communities aspired to marry one of the Allpachaka sons.

Finally, the university workers began to press the administration to help lobby for Allpachaka to achieve the status of district and have a police post opened there. The promotion of a hamlet or town to district has been a traditional means of "declaring independence" and strengthening direct ties to the provincial or department capital (Favre 1987, 26-27). There was also a strong resistance to the police presence in the Pampas River valley (Degregori 1986, 42) so there was a major change in attitude on the part of the Allpachaka workers to request a police post. We cannot not attribute all these changes exclusively to the University's program. Similar changes occurred in other areas of Huamanga province, but Allpachaka did accelerate them.
Contrary to what Díaz Martínez criticized in the late 1960s, the former feudatrarios turned out to be strongly favored by the project. As employees-landowners-merchants, they gradually rose above the stature of Ayacucho campesinos. There was actually little that the university could do to stop this process of differentiate, once started. The employees and workers union would have protested if the university decided to discriminate against the Allpachaka workers.
Little of the agricultural research found its way back to the countryside. Teachers and investigators found it hard to translate their studies into effective programs for the peasants. Allpachaka always had a vertical structure and the surrounding communities were always the least benefited by its programs. At most, the university hired local campesinos as extra help (peones) when needed.

The Centro de Capacitación Campesina (CCC) took a different approach and began to strike differences with the experimental station itself. For the first three years, the CCC continued operating a campesino school in Allpachaka where community leaders came for courses. Classes were examples of abstract learning in language which was over the heads of the peasants and removed from their real-life experiences. The CCC staffers soon found that communities did not send their leaders to the courses. Instead, the students were young people, easily spared from field work, who did not have the communal standing to pass on their learning experience to the rest of the community.

The staff gradually placed more emphasis on anthropological and agrarian studies of communal systems so the extension work could begin from the campesinos' own level. After 1979, the center actively sought direct contact with the communities and helped plan, finance and carry out small rural development projects in Pampas river valley. After 1980, Allpachaka no longer served as the campesino school and remained a supply depot. Eventually, the CCC program aimed to bring together the individual communities into a single peasant federation to address the social and economic problems of their region.

Sendero always had a position of sharp criticism against the centers and international financial support in Ayacucho. Foreign investigators and development staff may have had good intentions, but their reports and articles ended up published abroad to form a pool of intelligence against the revolution brewing in the Andean hinterland. Once guerrilla activities started, there was also a serious concern on Sendero's part that the field

trips and encounters with the campesinos would lead to intelligence leaks to security forces. The small works carried out by the centers were "detouring the people from revolution and delaying its ignition," deceiving them into thinking that the works would contribute to their wellbeing. The head of the Allpachaka bilingual school was Sendero's pointman in the zone and actively intervened to sabotage the CCC's efforts to relaunch the center's extension work. Sendero was, however, never aware of the CCC proposal of bringing the communities together in an intra-communal organization, staff workers say. In fact, the CCC never suffered an attack from Sendero during this opening phase, mainly because there was nothing physical to hit at. All the small-scale infrastructure was absorbed into the campesino communities.

The attacks

In May, 1980, Sendero launched its armed insurrection and gradually built up momentum. Through small, carefully planned actions, Sendero was sweeping the countryside clear of obstacles. (Gorriti 1990)

On August 3, 1982, a Senderista column appeared at Allpachaka. It rounded up the neighboring comuneros and forced them loot and burn the center (DESCO, 85-6). In a conspicuous deviation from Andean respect for livestock, the attackers slaughtered four Brown Swiss breeding bulls and 18 dairy cows, by plunging a knife into the base of the skull and the thorax repeatedly. However, when they started killing the animals, campesino women threw their arms around the cows and asked why they did not kill them too. The guerrillas distributed the remaining livestock among the peasants, who saw themselves as taking custody to return them to the university. However, when police arrived later and started searching the neighboring communities, they arrested those campesinos who had possession of livestock and took them to Lima. The University had to intercede to get them out of jail.

The guerrillas dynamited and burned the installations, burning documents and research archives. They burned two tractors and destroyed seed banks, wiping out 2,000 samples accumulated over 16 years of research. The attack also wiped out installations for cheese and wine making. Damages were roughly $2.2 million (Taylor 1983, 21).
The news of the attack against Allpachaka stirred up an uproar in Huamanga. The university community thought that Sendero would never dare to attack it because the party had always defended the democratic space within the university. It was the forger of revolutionaries. The buzz in town was that "Sendero has really botch it this time." The university organized a caravan of buses, trucks and other vehicles, loaded with students professors and workers to visit the farm. The university rector, agronomist Enrique Moya who had been crucial in starting the CCC program, proposed to reconstruct Allpachaka, clean up the damage and put in back in operation. For the first time, Sendero broke its vowed silence and stopped the vehicles to explain why it had destroyed the center. Three armed cadres stopped the buses on the way to Allpachaka and informed the Huamanga students that the university could continue with its work at

Allpachaka but it would have to "change its ways." They gave three month's time to produce results.

Within weeks of the incident, however, public opinion in Huamanga shifted from rejection to justification of the attack. Sendero and its sympathizers cited the social changes brought about by the program's existence, how the cheese and wine production ended up on the tables of the town middle class and the absence of effective results in the research. Sendero was also reaching its peak in popular support during the later half of 1982, marked by the massive turnout for the funeral of the girl guerrilla commander, Edith Lagos.

Meanwhile, Sendero was taking action in the southern Ayacucho provinces. Shortly after the attack, 2,000 peasants from communities throughout the Pampas river valley came to Allpachaka. With 100 yoke of oxen, the campesinos plowed and planted the fields communally. The armed conflict intensified with the intervention of the army a few months later. The communities never harvested the crops. Sendero also brought 200 head of sheep liberated from neighboring Huancasancos and distributed them among the Rio Pampas communities. The high point was a feast in which the guerrillas slaughtered six bulls and distributed the meat equitably to every man, woman and child. "They announced that they had established the New State of Peru which would develop so campesinos would be self-sufficient," writes Billie Jean Isbell, an anthropologist who reconstructed the events from conversations with peasants several years later. They also distributed red wine brought from the coast (or more likely, taken from Allpachaka's warehouses since the Huayapampa experimental station's vineyards used Allpachaka to age wine). (Isbell 1988: 10)
Although Senderistas condemned capitalist encroachment through the Allpachaka experimental station and the CCC efforts, it proved less capable of developing a viable alternative for the local communities. Isbell pointed out that the cadres completely misinterpreted the Andean agrarian system, trying to force a collective cultivation on the peasants in Chuschi. "...(The) organizers of the insurgency had identified the appropriate conflicts and stereotypical enemies to target in order to engender peasant support. But they failed when they tried to impose an idealized view of the maiety system that had no bases in local reality. They were as ill-informed as Velasco's agrarian reform planners." (Isbell 1988, 11)
Ayacucho promotion workers also report that Sendero engaged in similar experiments in large-scale communal agricultural efforts in northern part of Ayacucho, around Huanta.

On November 16, a Sendero column returned and destroyed what remained of the installations, including the bilingual school which they had spared in the first attack because of the pleading and weeping of women and children. This second time, the neighboring communities were wary about getting involved and Sendero was distrustful of the communities. Complete destruction and slaughter was the command. To reinforce its presence, Sendero brought in campesinos from communities as far away as Sarhua and Quispillacta, which meant walking for two or three days.

This was part of Sendero's strategy to seal off the countryside from outside influence, to increase pressure on Huamanga and other urban holdouts and also to provoke a stronger reaction from the Lima government.

Aftermath

One interpretation for Allpachaka attack is that the university ran it as a "profit center" for university finances and it had little direct, beneficial effect for the surrounding communities. The administrator of the unit was appointed by the accounting department, to whom he had to answer for all his decisions, and not to the agronomy program. The center aided "pure research," but did not have much bearing on the academic program or extension work among the communities. The campesinos did not benefit from the breeding program because few of them could afford to buy a Brown Swiss. Only in 1989 did the agriculture program set up research for improving the breeding of the native cattle stock.

Just as SL did not tolerate competitors in the Ayacucho countryside, it would later target cooperatives in Puno.
TAFOS/Ayaviri, 1991

Other agronomists think that Sendero struck at Allpachaka simply because it represented a real alternative for regional development. It was, however, more a symbol of a kind of development which university professors and the Huamanga middle class wanted for the region, one that would be driven by technology, university-educated expertise and government funding. A collateral effect of the Allpachaka attack was that all the small landholders left the region, mainly concentrated in Andahualyas province (Apurimac). These were the main beneficiaries of extension work, improving potato yields and cattle fattening.

The real reasons for the attack were two-fold. The strategic military value of Allpachaka made Sendero Luminoso want to clear out the zone of outside influence. Sendero Luminoso was playing off 10 years of ground work in the countryside. Its obsessive concentration on military aspects made them unwilling to permit other players in the game. Sendero had also entered into a phase in which it wanted to escalate the conflict, drawing in the armed forces. (Gorriti 1990, 278-283)

The attack also delivered a political message to the university in Huamanga -- for those who did not have the resolve or the conviction to set out on Sendero's revolution. The nucleus of a political option that centered on Moya as rector and encompassed Izquierda Unida, independents and a technical-productive option found itself blocked and demoralized from developing a coherent response to the Senderista insurgency. Despite having won the administrative skirmishing for control of the university, Sendero laid out claims on spheres of activities and vetted others' presence.

The Allpachaka incident is indicative of other factors. Development work, especially the more traditional approaches involving straight-forward transfers of technology and investigation, opens up local divisions. Frequently, the pure research seems more valuable to international interests than to local peasants. Research was more successful in establishing the university and its professors' reputation nationally and abroad than in yielding results for the campesino communities. At the same time, the cash flow resulting from research (hired labor, services and other payments) had an impact on the local impoverished economy.
In 20 years, the university failed to breed a regional development program. Despite concerted efforts to adequate technology to local conditions (cattle breeding, pasturelands and native crops), the university had serious problems in making these findings available to communities. There was no matching up between a technical proposal and the communities. Neither the CCC, the university or the other centers of Ayacucho (much less the State) ever got around to proposing a development strategy for the region.

Once under direct military command as of January, 1983, the GSOs' reaction was to pull back their presence to areas within the province of Huamanga. Most of them pulled back to areas to which Sendero did not assign an operation priority. Second, the emphasis shifted to technical programs and away from organizing and leadership building. Compared to other regions, like Cusco, Puno or Piura, GSOs were recent arrivals in Ayacucho. Centers did not start programs until the late 1970s when Sendero had already laid the groundwork for insurrection. Although some government and university program had brought some innovations, they were limited in scope.

On the new, reduced scale, GSOs did not seem to have a serious problem in the countryside among their local partners. In fact, the pull-back corrected a dispersion of efforts in several centers, which tried to cover immense territories. The problem was getting there and maintaining an urban base of operations, which could be targets of sabotage or bombings. All the major centers (CEDAP, TADEPA, IER Arguedas) received threats because they represent a left wing option in municipal or regional government. The centers and individual staff members also take a role in the popular movement in Huamanga, especially the Federación Agraria Departamental de Ayacucho (FADA), affiliated to the Confederación Nacional Agraria.

One fatal consequence of the retreat was the abandoning of the organizing and promotional work in the Apurimac valley where there was the germ of a modern, export-oriented economy and new peasant organizations. Sendero and, later, the military's priorities precluded any outside presence in the zone.
The one exception to the retreat was the CCC. It maintained a presence on the northern slopes of the Pampas river valley. It escaped reprisals because the institution received oversight from the university and because most staffers were local people. The other GSOs also have foreign financing and superior pay scales while the CCC works with university-level salaries. One of the drawbacks of the CCC's efforts is that its staff did not have a regional or national vision and ended up unaware of the worsening conditions and the worsening conditions.

The CCC accepted the "methodological challenge" of continuing its work in the Pampas river basin. They were still stuck in the question of how to keep a presence in the communities, when to hold courses, when and how to provide inputs and other resources to the communities. Yet the most striking conclusion from this center's work is its capacity to mold itself to the potential of its local partners, accepting the methods and procedures that expose the communities to the least risk.

However, centers were slow to realize both the problems and the potential of Ayacucho campesinos communities. A large part of the Ayacucho elite in the university and centers underestimated the capacity of campesino communities to resist the onslaught of violence. Not until after 1985 did most centers and investigators wake up to the resilience in campesino communities. Most centers did not realize there were other needs arising in those circumstances. The war was leading to a recomposition of the family productive unit because of the loss of male members, decapitalization and loss of work inputs and tools, migratory processes, lack of communication with the interior.
Amazingly, the campesino communities were prepared to accept the risks of joining rural development programs. During the 1986-1988, a window of opportunity for breaking the spiral of violence, peasants lined up to receive credits from the Agrarian Bank and drive off with their tractors. In mid-1989, campesinos appeared at the doorsteps of GSOs with assembly petitions to restart contacts for development programs.

However, there can be a self-deluding component in centers' efforts to continue with their work, despite the odds against them. A manifestation of this can be found in a 300-page published text of a conference on development projects in Ayacucho which took place in October, 1987 (PRATEC 1988). Admittedly a technical event, strongly influenced by a group of experts rescuing and systematizing native Andean agricultural methods, there was only a minimal discussion of how eight years of violence has had an impact on the local partners, institutions and work methods. The impression is that the violence is a battle between Sendero and the Lima government and has little to do with those who have not taken sides.

In 1988, ten Ayacucho centers set up a coordinating body, the Inter-Institutional Committee for Regional Development of Ayacucho (CIDRA) to try to keep from stepping on each others' toes and to work with government institutions. This attempt to centralize coordination and information came surprisingly late in the process to alter the dynamics of violence.

When the national GSOs finally woke up to the problem that violence was going to be a constant ingredient in their fieldwork in 1989, a first reaction was to turn to Ayacucho as a case which could show how to continue with development under dire circumstances. They did not find an environment typical of the rest of the country. The nine years of conflict in Ayacucho have closed down most broad social spaces where centers can exercise an influence and civilian reserves were depleted. Violence, assassinations and threats have annulled municipal government and communal arenas.

The Ayacucho GSOs had several advantages for keeping a foot in the countryside. There has been a ready supply of agronomists, anthropologists and other professionals graduated from the University of Huamanga. The University was the founding stone of regional awareness. The staff members have close relationships with the community, through a series of mechanisms which are extremely important in the Sierra. These include kinship, compaternity, blood brothers.
During the period starting in October, 1989 through the municipal and national election campaigns, Sendero began a phase of intense harassment of all possible nuclei of organization. The military reciprocated, especially after general elections. The city lost a massive block of its middle and professional classes, which fled to Lima. The countryside deteriorated into a condition of upheaval and mayhem, with vigilante groups pillaging neighboring communities. Peasants displaced from the countryside flooded the already overstretched urban services. The GSOs finally had to withdraw from the countryside, using the opportunity to review and critique their fieldwork and programs. In September, 1989, CEDEP had its staff workers detained by a Senderista column and its vehicle destroyed, as a warning to stay out of the countryside during the municipal election period.

Despite these adversities and handicaps, 17 centers remained in Ayacucho in mid-1990 and have gained a place alongside the University as pillars of the regional society. The centers had shown a remarkable perseverance in the face of overwhelming odds. They remain a valuable resource in rebuilding a ravaged community, both as a pool of trained and experience staff and as a clearinghouse of contacts with rural communities. This investigation may criticize aspects of their operations and methods, but it cannot minimize their dedication and courage.

There were obvious structural and global problems in confronting the problems facing Ayacucho and rural development. The university had to defend itself from the distrust and aggressions from the Lima government. Despite the rising attention on the plight of Ayacucho, there was no concerted effort on the part of the Lima government or other civilian institutions to reinforce local efforts. When half-hearted efforts to reverse the situation began to falter, the national forces tried to ignore the signs of

failure. A national response to a regional problem is the opportunity to draw several steps back from the issues and examine them more dispassionately, to draw on external resources and perspectives to get a fresh grasp of the crucial factors.

Finally, the introduction of a political-military command in the Ayacucho emergency zone meant that the university and the community had to grapple with a counterpart which defied the traditional means of negotiations. The political-military command was a wild card in the intricate relationships of a closed provincial society. Each year was a Russian roulette on what type of commander the government would appoint. For all purposes, the commander was a temporal prince in a realm under siege by dialectic barbarians. Each regent was supremely ignorant about how Huamanga society worked, much less the rural communities of Ayacucho.

2. Puno:
Instituto de Educación Rural Waqrani
"Rising from the Ashes"

Since the early 1980s, Sendero and observers have eyed the department of Puno, on the southern plateau near Lake Titicaca, as the likely scene of a "second Ayacucho." The region is poor, rural, backward and economically depressed. Cyclical draughts and flooding measurable over decades and centuries have knocked the steam out of economic improvement. Exploitation on the basis of race, culture and class was part of the land-owning system. The Agrarian Reform concentrated land into even fewer holders than under the hacienda system. Both mining and jungle colonization, two alternatives for regional development, failed to materialize viable options, being sources of exploitation. The potential for polarization was high. (IDL 1989d)

In Puno, the presence of more than 100 development and assistance projects, including non-government agencies, bilateral and multilateral projects, and state programs made a special impact. This funding reached everyone from the upper classes down to the campesino community. Far more resources, however, were funneled into the inefficient cooperatives than land-poor peasants. Some of these programs stemmed from relief work, both state and private, due to natural disasters and tainted the relationships between many programs and their recipients. In addition, the increased awareness that subversive violence was spreading through the Andes and the consequences of the Latin American debt crisis increased the presence of rural and urban development programs in the zone.

To better understand the unique dynamics of Puno and its lessons in survival under duress, we have to take a look at the presence of the Catholic Church. The Sur-Andino Catholic Church has a regional focus, encompassing the dioceses of Juli (Aymara-speaking zone around Lake Titicaca), Puno, Ayaviri and Secuani (Cusco). Originally, the dioceses of Cusco and Chuquibambilla (Abancay) belonged to the regional coordination, but they separated from the coordinating body for practical and ecclesiastic reasons.

Theology of Liberation and the group of clergy and lay people rallied around Father Gustavo Gutierrez strongly influenced the regional church. An openness to new theological, pastoral and political approaches stemmed in part from the presence of foreign clergy and Peruvian clergy trained abroad. The Sur-Andino church became a regional laboratory for the social ministry of Peru's progressive church.

The church hierarchy's endorsement of a preferential option for the poor led to a pro-campesino approach and had several effects on political and rural development in the region. It meant that one of the traditional pillars of the Peruvian status quo swung its support around to grassroots organizations, policies and outlooks. Bishops and prelates, with all the trappings of authority, shifted the balance of power in the countryside. This strategy threw the Church, its associated groups -- the campesino federation and political allies -- into direct conflict with entrenched regional interests (the agrarian cooperatives, trading companies -- with interests in contraband and even narcotrafficking -- and power cliques) and national forces (the Lima government, the ruling party and security forces).

However, this change and its implementation did not come by ecclesiastical edict. Over two decades, the Sur-Andino Church showed a capacity for criticism and analysis, both of its own performance and other social actors, with a strong emphasis on moral, ethical and cultural aspects. These princes of the Church and their lay workers had more moral authority than any civilian government in the zone. It created a space where foreign and Peruvian participants, lay and clergy, political and non-political outlooks, pastoral and temporal approaches could interact. This "thinking room" included permanent institutions and periodic meetings. This approach also required short-, medium and long-term planning, with regular coordination and strategic planning. It has given the region a shared language, a code to communicate among itself. The Church's method of working affected its pastoral mission and its social action programs, which were, for all purposes, indistinguishable from non-Church GSOs in the region. The approach also touched the latter because they learned from the Church's experience and interaction.

Another outgrowth of this strategy was a willingness to incorporate a cultural dimension into reflection and praxis. The presence of three (or more) cultures -- Aymara, Quechua and Creole-Spanish, plus foreigners from North America and Europe -- coexisting within the same region made participant groups examine their participation for biases and prejudices. The Sur-Andino Church also tried to incorporate peasants into the church structure as baptizers, catechists and pastoral animators. The Church took this step to fill the shortage of clergy to do all the church rites, but it also stemmed from a stated objective to incorporating the peasants as equal participants in dialogue. It had the secondary effect of developing generations of local leaders. This becomes evident when examining the lists of collaborators with centers, peasant federation leaders and elected authorities (municipal and regional).

The pastoral strategy gave the Sur-Andino Church vitality, commitment and resilience in the face of adverse situations. During the 1983-86 string

of natural disasters (drought and flooding), it critically examined relief work. By using food and other donations to set up communal stores and seedbanks, it strengthened local organizations, rather than creating a dependence on handouts and charity. When Puno seemed to be a powder-keg in 1986, its bishops and prelates intervened directly with President García to convince him that a restructuring of land distribution in Puno was a prerequisite for pacifying the area. A conference, called "Puno Wants Peace" in August, 1986, focused national attention on the region when the threat of a militarization of the region, rising para-military activity against the Church and centers and the land issue were close to pushing Puno over the brink (mid-1986).

We have described at length the Sur-Andino Church's role because it differentiates Puno from Ayacucho, both as a religious manifestation and as a response to the political and social conditions of the region. The Ayacucho dioceses was conservative, traditionalist in its pastoral and liturgical practices, had few social action programs (pointedly in the charity mode) and was distant from the peasant majority of the region. There were individual exceptions to the Ayacucho Church's conduct. After 1988, a Jesuit group began a more sensitive ministry in the region.

Another issue that distinguished Ayacucho from Puno is land. Under the Agrarian Reform affecting nearly 2 million hectares in Puno, 53 cooperatives received more than 90% of the land while campesino communities got 2.5% and individual holders 7.5%. Despite holding most of the arable land, the cooperatives were inefficient and corrupt. By 1983, campesino federations were demanding a restructuring of the cooperatives to give land-hungry peasants another chance at productive endeavors. (Renique 1987 and Lopes 1988)

Puno communities mobilize to take control of cooperatives' land
Melchor Lima/TAFOS, 1991, Ayaviri

In late 1985, the issue came to a head. The first land seizures occurred on November 4. The communities of Macari and Santa Rosa took 10,500 hectares from the ERPS Kunaruna in the province of Melgar. During the next four years, other campesino communities and smallholders seized, perhaps, as much as 400,000 hectares. The García administration pushed forward a restructuring of land held by the cooperatives. It claimed that it had handed over more than 800,000 hectares to peasants, but the campesino federation countered that much of the land was given to the associative enterprises under another guise.
During the hottest period of seizures, 1986-1989, only one person, a campesino, was killed in confrontations with police, army or armed cooperative employees. Considering the scope and stakes of the movement, this is an amazing accomplishment and an indication that

Sendero failed to make inroads in the Puno peasant movement. The land issue will continue to be conflict-prone for years to come.

Sendero's beachhead in the Sur-Andino

Puno is far removed from Sendero's traditional stomping ground in the central Sierra. Due to its strategic value within Sendero's Andean scheme, the party has maintained presence in the zone since the mid-1970s. The Puno region is culturally distinct from the Andes on the other side of La Raya pass on the frontier with Cusco. Sendero was an outsider and an intruder on local politics. However, Puno offered several advantages for Sendero. It came as close as possible in conforming to Sendero's analysis of a comprador-bureaucratic alliance in the State (PCP 1988, II, 4-5). The partnership between cooperative managements, Arequipa wool interests and the regional state bureaucracy, especially the Agrarian Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture, reaped the benefits from the wool and livestock business while cooperative members and campesinos got the short end of the stick. The countryside is relatively empty, with a few urban centers of size and campesinos communities scattered in disperse areas, usually on the worst land. It had strategic value due to its proximity to Bolivia, Cusco and Arequipa.

In 1981, Sendero's first actions included the attack on the IER Palermo, but the emphasis was on enacting crude justice against local powers and cattle thieves. It started working the Puno university, the technological and teachers' colleges.
By 1986, SL moved into the region in a big offensive, mobilizing two or three columns with up to 50 armed combatants and calling on another 200 activists as advance men, logistical support and intelligence gatherers. The guerrilla column's main field of operation was Azángaro province and, later, Melgar. Most (60%) associate enterprises were concentrated in those two provinces. It haunted the badlands of the province, living in abandoned mine shafts or shepherds' huts. The columns frequently slipped into the Cusco highlands, Arequipa or Bolivia.(IPA 1990, 281).

In 1986, Sendero tried to preempt the land issue by beginning a series of "armed expropriations," forcing campesinos to accompany them in their raids and looting. During the period of February, 1986 and April, 1987, more than 100 people died in the battles and skirmishes, including police, SL activists, cooperative workers and staff, and campesinos. In Asangaro, Sendero managed to eliminate the associative enterprises even before the government land redistribution came. It blew up most rolling stock and stole much of the herds, distributing them among the poor campesinos.
In other words, there were simultaneously three proposals for land restructuring in Puno: Sendero's at the point of a gun, the Aprista government's with the endorsement of the cooperatives and, finally, the one backed by the Sur-Andino Church, the campesino federation and Izquierda Unida.
Sendero's aim was to provoke a militarization of the department, forcing the government to send in the armed forces and a polarization of regional politics. This would cut out the middle ground where it was numerically and conceptually at a disadvantage.

Although Sendero suffered several defeats in the region between 1987 and 1990, it recovered from these losses and kept the pressure on the Sur-Andino Church, the campesino federation and the political parties, as well as the government and the cooperatives. This was a sign of the strategic importance of the region for Sendero's plans.

The IER Waqrani

Founded in 1964 as part of the new social doctrine of the post-Vatican II Church, the Instituto de Educación Rural Waqrani was a part of the Prelature of Ayaviri's pastoral plan. Its headquarters, located 11 kilometers outside Ayaviri, has 962 hectares of land, used for agricultural experimentation and demonstration. It had living quarters for staff and workers, administrative offices, classrooms, a library, a dormitory for visiting campesinos. In the early days, there were workshops for carpentry, mechanics and training programs. However, by concentrating its activities on young campesinos it pulled out of their communities, training them in skills which would
allow them to
migrate more easily.



From 1976 to 1979, Dominican brothers managed the IER, specializing in agricultural work, and closed the vocational workshops. They started a stable of Swiss Brown dairy cattle, which still sells milk three times a week, all year round, in Ayaviri. However, the IER staff in the mid-1980s considered this activity a poor example to show to the peasants because they would probably never be able to obtain the capital or cover the operating costs. The stable required permanent attention and was one of the reasons for keeping staff on the site.

Map of Theater of Guerrilla Operations in Puno, 1984-1990

In 1979, the IER Waqrani started to go out into the countryside, always talking about land as the central problem of Puno agriculture. It concentrated its work on three communities, Macari, Santa Rosa and Orurrillo, in the province of Melgar. It provided technical support for crops and livestock, better methods and advice on marketing, and collateral services. In addition, it helped analyze the political, economic and social situation, providing information that was not available to peasants. Parallel to technical assistance, the teams prepared community leaders and strengthened local organizations. Its educational and training programs took place at its headquarters or in the communities' campesino schools. The team differentiated its methods between axis communities and pilot communities. The former (Macarí) had its traditional Andean communal organization fully functional while the latter (Orurrillo) were mainly small landholders whose communal ties were weak or non-existent. Santa Rosa fell between the two.

This methodology became known as the "Waqrani strategy" in the region. It put emphasis on teamwork, six technicians, four social workers, six workers and five part-time staff, plus the director, administrator and secretary. The IER also maintained links with nine other research and development centers in Puno, participating in the drafting of a proposal for regional development.

However, in its work with local communities, it soon became clear that no improvement in farming or grazing methods could make these communities viable. The small size of their landholdings kept them from reaching reasonable levels of productivity and volume and population pressure would continue to peer down on living standards. The IER team began an analytical work which showed that, despite the communities' limitations, they still made better use of land and other resources than the associative enterprises which monopolized the best land. The only way to break out of this bottleneck was a redistribution of landholdings in the province and the department. (Vega 1985)

This analysis had enormous implications for the region because the associative enterprises were the most powerful entrenched interest in Puno. The land issue became part of the Sur-Andino Church's social ministry. Indeed, the land issue would not have received as much political attention if the Church had not supported it. The IER team also brought the land issue to the attention of the United Left (more precisely the Partido Unificado Mariateguista which is the only party with effective work in the

Puno countryside). The land issue also put the IER staff into contact with peasant federations, other political forces and centers. The Federación Unificada de Campesinos del Melgar (FUCAM) asked for technical assistance in drafting a proposal to redistribute land held by associative enterprises. Later, the IER Waqrani team moved into an advisory functions with the Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Peru. This was a highly visible function, staffers being present at most assemblies and events over the next five years.

By mid-1988, the IER began an experimental program in three districts with eight communities, each with an average 100 families, in Melgar province. The idea was to pull up the productivity of the empresas comunales without assistencialism. Other zonal, district and provincial agrarian federations were to use these examples to fortify their own communal units. The team wanted to provide technology and management skills which would permit the empresas comunales to make productive use of the land which they had seized or received from the government. This effort was political a challenge of Sendero's guerrilla tactics in the zone since Sendero had already staked its claim on campesino demands.

However, this mutual commitment to land redistribution carried its problems. There was an implicit tension between the sponsoring institution (the Prelature), the IER staff and the other organizations concerned, despite sharing criteria, methods and goals. The Prelature (and the Sur-Andino Church) was willing to be an instigator of social change, but it could not exceed its own mission as an ecclesiastical organization. The other components headed in a more political direction, sometimes radicalizing their demands for extemporaneous reasons. The Waqrani director, Ricardo Vega, served on the pastoral council, an elected position, so there was direct input from the Prelature in designing this strategy.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the "Waqrani strategy" was its regional perspective and outreach. In many ways, it was the operative center and flagship of the Sur-Andino strategy. It had the political wiles and campesino trust to lead the way.

Regional strike protesting price increases and agricultural policy
Blocking the railway
Melchor Lima/TAFOS,1989, Ayaviri, Puno,

This approach logically ran into the opposition of the cooperatives, the ruling party and security forces. During the heated period preceding and during the land seizure movement, police repeatedly stopped and searched Waqrani vehicles. IER staff had their tires deflated when parked in town. Vega and other staffers were arrested for short periods of time. The Puno anti-terrorist police chief called him in for a blunt conversation about his activities. The Puno cooperative association enterprises accused Waqrani, its staff and PUM of being the legal arm of Sendero.

The Waqrani team had to take precautionary measures both against security forces and cooperative workers and Sendero. These started with intelligence work to know where guerrilla columns and anti-terrorist police units were active. By early 1989, the Waqrani staff had removed some non-essential equipment, archives and other items from the experimental farm. The senior staff members no longer slept at the farm, but in town. In addition, local peasants or ronderos stood watchout around the experimental farm to alert the workers about strangers approaching.

The Attack

On May 21, at 7:00 pm, a truck pulled into the Waqrani experimental station. Some 20 guerrillas jumped out and overpowered the workers. The column leaders asked for the three staff leaders by name, but they had already gone into the town. The guerrillas made quick work of the installations, destroying the teaching and administrative facilities and equipment like tractors, vehicles and generator. However, it did not touch the stables, livestock or living quarters of the workers. It was a blow at the brains and mobilizing forces of the Waqrani team.

The guerrillas had started on its rampage on May 13 in Muñani in the eastern reaches of Azangaro province. On May 19, it assassinated the mayor of Azángaro, Marcelino Pachirri. He had emerged as a new kind of popular leader, playing a prominent role in the agrarian strikes in September, 1988, and March, 1989. He also extended municipal services to the rural population. The Waqrani team and the Church-campesino intelligence network thought that this was the objective of the column's activities, and lowered its defenses. Sendero also staged a diversionary tactic by commandeering a truck and sending it through to Cusco, thus making it seem as if the column had made its escape out of the region. After hitting IER Waqrani, the column struck at the Universidad Nacional del Altiplano's experimental station at San Juan de Chuquibambilla that same night. It blew up five tractors and other installations. It then went to Macarí, the flagship community of the Waqrani program. It killed the lieutenant governor and a justice of the peace. After rounding Lake Langui-Layo in Canas province (Cusco), it headed back. It hit the two high-altitude experimental stations at La Raya on May 25. The one run by San Marcos University's IVITA program suffered serious damage. The Universidad Nacional de Cusco farm got off more lightly. It then swung through the eastern part of Melgar provinces and ended its sortie in Azángaro.

The guerrilla unit covered 700 kilometers in 16 days, averaging an attack a day and killing seven people. A second unit kept up pressure in Azangaro during the period. "Sendero has shown a logistical support which we never suspected," said a veteran GSO director. It was active but dissimulated, doing the necessary groundwork before launching into superior phases. During this whole period, security forces did not make a single attempt to intercept the column. Eight truckloads of army troops arrived in Azangaro and committed abuses against the local population. Another unit took up position in Ayaviri.

Sendero's message at Waqrani was that the Church should not stick its nose into politics, development and popular organization or lend itself to other forces, like PUM. Waqrani was attacked because of its educational and thinking capacity because it was able to generate responses to the changing conditions in Melgar province and Puno department.

The Aftermath

The 25th anniversary of the IER Waqrani took place on June 15, 1989. Plans had originally aimed for a major celebration, renewing the commitment between campesino communities, the Prelature, the Sur-Andino church and regional groups. After the attack, there were serious doubts whether to hold it at all. The guerrilla column was still in the zone. It was clear that Sendero's mobility should not be underestimated. The prelature and the IER staff decided to scale the celebration back to a one-day affair so that visiting delegations would not have to travel at night.

The first rally point was the IER Waqrani station itself where visitors could inspect the damages. A photography exhibit showed a dramatic before-and-after account of the attack and its role in forging a "way of the campesino community." The ceremony was brief. Despite the music and the reunion of Sur-Andino allies, the atmosphere was tense. As the visitors climbed into their bicycles, motorbikes, cars, trucks and buses to return to Ayaviri, the most threatening moment for a Senderista attack, the veil of fear lifted. The ride back, shrouded in plumes of road dust from dozens of vehicles, was festive. Back in Ayaviri, the mobilized visitors met up with late comers and townspeople to march to the main square. On the footsteps of church, Monsignor Francisco d'Alteroche said mass, accompanied by his fellow bishops and clergy of the Sur-Andino. Most of the delegations headed home by 4:00 pm. The campesinos continued celebrating well into the night.

There is an obvious comparison with the university caravan after the Allpachaka attack and the sense of defeat in Ayacucho, there are other points worth mentioning. The Waqrani attack generated a political response in terms of masses. It was not just a problem of methodology or appearances. This played an important role in defeating the fear that Sendero tried to create to annul opposition. The attack generated a regional response that stretched from Cusco to Juli, with national components. From Lima came the Peruvian Episcopal Conference and its Church's progressive wing, Izquierda Unida legislators, human rights advocates, representatives of the ANC and journalists from print and electronic media. The anniversary celebration was a symbolic gesture that

drew on the significance of the Church and the popular movement in the region. The slogan launched for the event was "IER Waqrani will rise from the ashes."

However, the climatic celebration marked a watershed in the grueling, tense period of 1985-90 for the Ayaviri prelature, its secular wing and the other organizations which revolved around them. In the following days, the Prelature told the IER staff that the program was to be discontinued. The church was fighting a multi-front battle, in Lima, in Puno, inside the church and among other interests for and against the option chosen by the Sur-Andino church. Pressure came from several directions. The Lima church, several religious orders committed to work in the Altiplano and factions within the prelature were initially successful in forcing a retreat. On the other hand, the progressive wing of the Church tried to keep open the perspective of an active, fully implemented campaign in the prelature.

A primary criticism against the IER Waqrani strategy was the leadership team close association to PUM. The adversary tactics favored by this party, like land seizures and agrarian strikes, seemed to go against the Church's interests. This connection was played up in the Lima media, especially by a nationally broadcast news program. Monseignor D'Alteroche felt that he was being pulled into PUM's game. However, as several priests pointed out, the Sur-Andino Church had first laid out its campesino option and sent out calls for allies. IU had been the only political force to respond.

A major concern for the Prelature and the rest of the Sur-Andino church was that, during the whole period of commotion, the local representatives of the Lima government and security forces seemed to have decided to remain inert before the Senderista threat. It looked as if the government was satisfied to let the Sur-Andino campesino-church block and the Sendero war machine fight over political control of the region and then move in to pick up the pieces. There is a sense of resignation in the forces squared off against Sendero, as if it is inevitable that the fight degenerates into a shootout between the military and the guerrillas. The land seizures, police repression, Senderista harassment and the deepening economic crisis bore down on the grassroots organizations, especially the peasants.

This uncertainty combined with the lack of a political horizon which would permit regional leaders to make rational decisions about the future. This atmosphere of pessimism and fatigue strongly affected the attitudes of the Prelature. At one point, priests were talking about the need to prepare for a "Church of the Catacombs," harking back to the persecution of early Christians in Roman times. There was a strong inclination to "play safe," pulling back on risky initiatives to consolidate the achievements of the previous three years. The campesino communities needed time and resources to put their new landholdings into production, strengthen their organizations and take stock of what options were available in the future.

There was also an ethical question which haunted the Church program sponsors. "I am not going to be responsible for the loss of seven lives," said Monseignor D'Alteroche. "Waqrani puts at risk the lives of the people with whom they work. We should not be multiplying the risks at this point."

Keeping Waqrani in the field would provoke Sendero to strike against other institutions and the peasants themselves.

Monseignor D'Alteroche also mentioned that IER Waqrani was an expensive program to be maintained with high salaries paid to technicians, mainly of them outsiders to Ayaviri, with the constant need for administrative support, from keeping the cows fed to keeping the staff alive. The prelature could spent this same money on other pastoral missions, in the jungle with the miners, in urban centers to provide for education to children or better care for the elderly. These criticisms of the Waqrani formula came to the forefront after the attack. Other pastoral agents felt as if they have been left behind by the attention being given to the Waqrani team. The Monsignor said several times that Waqrani was not the flagship of the Ayaviri church, it was not its exclusive and most characteristic expression. "Why burn down the whole structure to preserve the barn?" he asked.

The counter-arguments of the Waqrani staff were that scaling back or stopping the church's presence in the countryside would mean huge losses. At a crucial juncture, the church was retreating. The campesinos needed to feel shelter and support. The relationship with the campesinos had been built up through face-to-face contact and years of work. When there were reports from the "front-line" organizations that Sendero was demanding that the presidents of the communities, communal enterprises and zonal federations resign, the Ayaviri prelature should not be sending signals that it was backing off.

The outlook for the coming 12 months was not good. Municipal, regional, general and presidential runoff elections were to take place between November, 1989 and June, 1990, providing a situation in which Sendero would be actively harassing its political adversaries. The Prelature decided to continue with a scaled-back IER Waqrani program and dismissed the rest of the IER team. Despite this tactical retreat, Sendero kept up a constant pressure on pastoral work. It even regain headhunting for prospective recruits in the Church's own youth work. Young lay leaders were snapped up and taken off to people's schools and given weekend briefings with cadres.

One of the most interesting reactions was the campesinos themselves. The FUCAM came to issue an ultimatum: if the Church decided that it would not continue with the Waqrani efforts, the federation would demand that all property and assets, including land and vehicles, be handed over to the federation. The donor agencies had allocated the funds for the benefit of the campesinos so they should be the final recipient if the program was not continued. The FCDP also demanded that the Church's commitment continue though their leaders were aware that changes would have to be introduced to adjust to the new conditions. FUCAM also offered to set aside land for Waqrani at its headquarters inside the town limits of Ayaviri. This move would have sharply reduced the risk of Senderista harassment. Leaders offered to provide manual labor in the reconstruction of the experimental station.

The campesinos made imaginative adjustments to the situation. For instance, district municipal councils no longer met in the town halls. Council sessions took place in the fields at lunch time, where they blended with campesino customs. Rather than individualizing leadership, grassroots organizations, like communal organizations or district federation, assumed collective leadership. When Sendero ordered the campesinos in Melgar province to abandon their "communal enterprises" and distribute the livestock among their members in December, they followed the instructions. The campesinos, however, kept a parallel accounting in which communal herds and crops, supposedly distributed to individuals, remain as a "family cooperative." The district, provincial and department federations created elaborate systems of intelligence and information exchange, vital for keeping leaders out of Sendero's reach. The peasants called these methods the "tactic of the vacuum" -- Sendero cannot kill or destroy what it cannot find. There are other examples of these strategies all along the Sierra, an Andean expression of passive resistance.

The Instituto de Pastoral Andina organized a first Sur-Andino "Social Week" encounter in Puno. The Instituto also published the papers and discussion promptly. (IPA 1990)
A new coalition of forces may put forward a more ambitious program to support Puno campesino communities, federations and other programs, drawing on staff and experience from Waqrani, pastoral efforts and human rights activists. The dismissed Waqrani staff either joined other centers, the FDCP or their political parties. The core of the Waqrani team continued to make lightning trips into the countryside of Ayaviri, driving home the message that they had not abandoned peasant organizations. A proposal for a regional program was to provide a service center for the proposals, projects and programs scattered around the department. It would also set up a data base to centralize information for regional development and fighting Sendero. One key issue is to avoid fragmenting the intervention of the centers and other groups, making them add up instead of remaining as separate, isolated units. The cornerstone in the new approach was to give a leadership role to campesinos, their local organizations and the FDCP in an attempt to maintain -- and in some cases rebuild the "communal way".

Conclusions

Measured by the reduced Waqrani program at a crucial juncture, the Senderista attack cut an operative knot in the ties between the pastoral mission, campesino federations and PUM's political strategy. However, there are indications that the Church and social and political organizations around the Sur-Andino strategy remade their pragmatic coalition under new terms. The depth in grassroots organizations and the flexibility of supporting institutions gave the Sur-Andino region the means to continue in the countryside. In addition, the setting up of a regional government, encompassing the departments of Puno, Moquegua and Tacna, opened a new, though risky arena for political work and consensus building.

The crucial question which has underlaid this section is why, despite the factors leaning towards polarization, Puno has been able to resist the dynamics of violence while other regions have not. In other words, what

has permitted rural development to be more than a mere slogan, but a motivating force in the region?
In 1988, an anthropologist said, "Rural development is a contention wall against Sendero." With the benefit of hindsight, it should be clear that the crucial element was not public or non-government rural development but how these programs inserted themselves into the regional context. The existence of strong, resilient grassroots organizations made the task easier for GSOs.

The regional context of Puno made it crucial and feasible to resist the demands to militarize the subversive conflict. It resorted to national and international resources to hold back an escalation of the conflict. The success of regional development efforts depend on reading the factors and using them to the advantage of development.
Due to the Sur-Andino Church's emphasis on culture, organization and leadership development, the target of popular education was never lost. The political sphere was never distant from the debate, leading to the preeminence of the land issue in setting concrete objectives. This emphasis also found an immediate expression in political structures, like Izquierda Unida. GSOs used opportunities, like draught and flooding, to pursue both short- and medium-term objectives in creative ways. The struggle pointed towards political initiative, not just technical-productive proposals. The Waqrani strategy was not an enclave, but had a regional impact.
A risk of the Puno experience is drawing the wrong lessons to apply on a national scale. For instance, PUM and several centers tried to apply the land restructuring issue in Junín without first making a thorough evaluation of the local conditions for sustaining the effort and the Senderista opposition. If Waqrani team and the Sur-Andino strategy sinned, it was putting too much emphasis on the political side of the formula and not giving more value to the cultural resistance and long-term patience that campesino communities carried with them.

Section Four

The Axis of War

Regional and local experiences

Grassroots support organizations are a new phenomenon in the Andean landscape and in Peru. The closest parallel is the equally recent presence of the state presence in a promotional role. Facing off against these suppliers of development services are hundreds and thousands of underprivileged and undereducated Peruvians demanding assistance in improving their plight.

The rural sociologist Telmo Rojas (1986, 385-93) gives a useful summary of the social structure in rural settings drawn working with microregional development agencies in Southern Peru and Cajamarca. There are parallel social strata in the urban and rural sectors, each differentiated between dominant and subordinated groups. Peasants are on the bottom rung of this power structure. The power networks which connect the urban sector with the countryside run through the systems of landholdings, commerce and the state apparatus. These networks are also tainted with rural-urban,

racial and ethnic discrimination. For the sake of simplification, we call this zone of conflict and tension the rural-urban interface.

The entrance of a GSO causes a realignment of the local balance of power. GSO programs, projects and ties with local partners do not fit neatly into the local structure. Their mandate and alliances lie outside the local context, with donor agencies, their headquarters offices, the national intelligentsia and other institutions. Centers provide new contact points in the rural-urban interface. GSOs are suppliers of scarce services and goods in environments of chronic poverty and shortage. As intruders aligned with grassroots organizations, they menace the local power networks in and of themselves. Some centers have even stated explicitly that one of their program objectives is to break the stranglehold that local power groups hold over their zones.

Centers' programs act on key pressure points, especially the market and state service, to improve the leverage of their local partners. For instance, marketing schemes for produce bite into the profit margins of traders or eliminate them completely. Efforts to organize communal stores hurt local merchants. Programs to strengthen grassroots organizations and improve education standards increase pressure on the government and other groups to take into account peasant demands.
Even though GSOs come to the aid of the generic poor, the objectives of their programs are specific communities and groups, which are, therefore, favored over other communities and groups. Therefore, opposition, resistance or resentment may not only come from entrenched local interests, but also those communities or underprivileged groups who do not have access to their services.

Local interest groups regularly accuse GSOs of being "agents of communism." They can also invent Senderista attacks to make authorities crack down on unruly peasant groups. There is a predisposition in the provincial news media to report acts of violence as a result of Senderista action. Over the past decade, most centers have learned that there is an advantage in working with more transparency, explaining their objectives and methods to local authorities and security forces. This has partially reduced some of the inherent suspicions and conflict.

Campesino communities spend an enormous amount of resources and time trying to get work and programs out of the government. If one summed all the expenses (trips to provincial or departmental capital -- or even Lima -- to petition authorities, fiestas and honors, slaughtering of livestock for fiestas, etc.), the community could easily finance most of public works themselves. One calculation for Cusco campesino community put the figure of time spent getting agrarian credits and other assistance from the State at 8,000 man-days a year (Paz-Tarea de Todos, No 7, 45-47)

Centers may aim to help the communities to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between the state, dependence, struggle and organizations, that there were means and mechanisms of getting what the community needed. Perhaps, this is one of the reasons that a fast growing sideline for GSOs is human rights work. Providing advice, lawyers and other assistance

to grassroots organizations improves grassroots organizations' bargaining position in the rural-urban interface. The presence of a trained professional alongside a peasant leader in dealing with state functionaries can change the terms of interaction.

This may also lead to a dependency on centers as intermediaries, just as peasants used to depend on their urban padrinos to intercede before judges and functionaries. "It would seem that centers organize the population to accept the project and participate more efficiently in its execution." (Gianotten and DeWit 1990, 249) Only by concentrating on organization and leadership development can centers expect to move beyond these paternalistic relationships.

Campesinos rarely discriminate between centers and state agencies. They make the same kind of requests to both in an attempt to get something out of these new intermediaries. The tendency towards integral development projects, combining agricultural promotion, marketing schemes, organization, health and education services and other aspects, show that the centers are aware that their local partners have a wide range of needs, demands and expectations. "We all wear the mask of public functionary," says an international development advisor.

Centers may distinguish themselves with a more horizontal, egalitarian treatment of campesinos and other "beneficiaries." They may reduce the paperwork and kowtowing to obtain benefits. Centers, however, are still firmly anchored within the rural-urban interface. They come with ready-made menus of programs, lines of actions and technological packages, as well as a hidden agenda. A grassroots leader once told Ton de Wit that the government, the parties, the centers and Sendero were all the same thing: they wanted to impose their priorities on the grassroots organizations.

Sendero has positioned itself strategically at the hub of fault lines in the bedrock of Peruvian society. It plays off the failed feedback between the center and the periphery, the intricacies of local politics and the experience and expectations of segments of the populace. Each setting has its own set of traditions, codes and dynamics, which also interplays with national trends and factors.

Like a shark scenting blood, Shining Path is almost in instinctively drawn to strife. "Shining Path has successfully in inserted into existing conflicts," says Andean historian Nelson Manrique. In a society like Peru, fragmented ethnically, socially and economically, these conflicts abound though they may appear to be personal vendettas or blood feuds. Disputes involving water rights or scarce grazing land can turn into one peasant community against another.
Sendero concentrates on a territorial turf to impose an "axis of war" on the local communities, the State, security forces and other actors in the zone. Priority areas are those which have the most dynamic impact on local settings -- education, land problems, the market and the state. Although Sendero feeds and works off local disputes, its general framework and strategies involve a global evaluation of national and regional tendencies.

This gives Sendero strategic advantages and tactical initiative over their civilian adversaries and even the Armed Forces.

This subversive strategy contrasts with the GSOs work. "The impact of the programs is restricted; it works in an isolated world and the interpretation is rather localist... The critique and analysis are planted on a regional and national plain, but a revisions of the proposals reveal a lacking of operative instruments to relate local actions with broader spheres." (Gianotten and De Wit 1990, 244, 247)

One of the complaints of the centers once they woke up was that they could grasp the issues of violence and its repercussions, but it was impossible to bring their local partners (associates or beneficiaries) around to understanding them in the same way. The campesinos have been living with violence and SL for a decade now and have developed their own defenses and responses to the problem. For instance, some native communities in the Amazon prefer to confront insurgent groups alone because the presence of outsiders only complicate the situation. In extreme cases, we have the Ashaninkas of Junín department who have practically declared a war against MRTA and Sendero in the zone, but also sweeping up neighboring native communities into the unrest.

"Each community has its different behavior in the face of violence," says an Ayacucho center director. "It acts to protect its members. Sometimes, it just vanishes when strangers approach."
During the 1970s and 1980s, centers gave a premium to working with campesino communities, especially those in Southern Peru that maintained their traditional structures. Because of the spiral of violence in the Central and Southern Andes and the increased awareness of the importance of rondas campesinas, there has been a marked increase in interest working in the Northern Andes. Today, there are about 40 centers working in Cajamarca, compared to less than a dozen two years.

The rondas campesinas of Cajamarca and Piura are not a guarantee that Sendero will be turned back in the northern Sierra. Although they are one of the most impressive social groups to emerge in this century, they have their weaknesses. Rondas are a means of maintaining the viability of small-property owners in rural areas. By organizing on caserio basis and joining rondas into broader organizations on a valley, district or provincial level, they can combat cattle thievery and other threats more effective without police protection. They quickly evolved into a parallel justice system and communal governments. Their broader mandate is to maintain communal equilibrium through consensual agreements within the ronda and with neighboring rondas on district and provincial levels. However, the function of campesino justice, which takes place in the communal assemblies, also works to maintain internal equilibrium. Analysts have frequently cited the ronda as a buttress against Senderista encroachment, implying that its law enforcement functions combat guerrillas. My findings, however, point in another direction.

The ronda's premium on internal cohesion keep internal dissidents from recurring to outside arbiters to achieve benefits. Sendero does not find the

raw material and local breaches to make its initial inroads. However, in areas where the government or parties interfere with rondas and take away their legitimacy as autonomous organizations (Cajabamba province in Cajamarca), then Sendero has a chance to exploit factional differences. This analysis is also important to compare with the armed forces's spotty performance with the use of "civil defense committees," modeled after those in Guatemala.

A case in point is the experience of a GSO in the Cajamarca area. It set up a program for distributing farm animals, seeds and other goods among peasants to increase the income options of peasant households. The center left it to the criteria of each locality's ronda to decide which family would receive each item. The rondas incorporated a non-technical criteria: how to maintain communal equilibrium.

A center operating in the Ayacucho countryside found a similar situation. "We could probably irrigation canals quicker and better if we had a cement mixer, but the machine is a symbol of power in Ayacucho," said the program director. A cement mixer is associated with government projects. "With the highest technology using fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides, we could probably get potato yields of 18-20 tons per hectare, instead of the average of 2-2.5 tons in Ayacucho. But by using more modest technological levels, we get 8-10 tons." The campesinos are content with the higher yields and the program does not create a problem when the center leaves and subsidized fertilizers are no longer available.

We may draw the conclusion that rural development programs must pay attention to the local dynamics of conflict and tension and cede more initiative to local organizations in the allocation of resources. In addition, centers should find the means of allowing broad-based organizations intercede in the setting of goals and methods to avoid conflicts with communities which will not receive immediate benefits. For instance, if a district peasant federation is a co-sponsor of a marketing or production scheme for a specific project, it can explain to other communities that the project will eventually yield dividends for them, even though they are not participants. Marketing networks could be expanded or a pilot project in innovative farm techniques could be tested and made available.
"Sendero is the external auditor of centers' programs," says economist Javier Igüínez. "Only those with top quality will persist, and it doesn't matter if you carry a couple of pistols,"
Several supervisors of development programs ask how much of the GSO funding actually gets down to the grassroots. As little as 20 percent of the funding goes to the local partners, say the most severe critiques. Although programs usually start out with modest budgets, the costs of maintaining a team in the field and making it functional become more expensive as time goes on. This is covered up by the fact that program targets do go up, but not as fast as costs.

This is a point that is harshly criticized by Sendero for the past decade. It says that centers, their staffs and other exploit the plight of the poor for their personal or institutional benefit. Center staff rent the best housing in urban centers, ride in four-wheel-drive vehicles, earn a salary (perhaps,

pegged to the U.S. dollar or indexed to inflation) above the average of the region. Working conditions and salaries may actually be better than most university-levels in Lima. They are certainly better than the local partners'. Under normal conditions, these disparities would be rationalized by the center's rhetoric of serving grassroots organizations and the benefits from the programs. Under Peru's current conditions, centers look like enclaves of privilege.

On the hand, center directors say that there is a distinction between programs in rural and urban areas. Rural programs tend to fit into the more austere methods required by working with peasant communities and organizations. Also centers with their operational roots in Lima or provincial capitals are naturally drawn towards research, investigation and institutional consolidation.

In the most extreme manifestation of this elitist approach, some center leaders go as far as to say, privately though not publicly, that the centers are ends unto themselves; the donors should continue to support them because they are backing the national intelligentsia. The grassroots organizations are merely props for an institution building of more importance. This attitude contains a high degree of hubris and arrogance.

Government and political party relations

When GSOs first appeared in rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s, the political landscape was clear. Peasants, left wing parties and the GSOs on one side and the government, ruling parties and entrenched interests on the other. With the return to democracy, that situation has become more confusing. With the diversification of government through municipal and regional governments and para-state institutions, GSOs and grassroots organizations find that colleagues and associates have gained positions of administrative and political power.

Since the mid-1980s, there has also been an effort to make a more efficient use of scarce resources by coordinating development work between GSOs and government or international agencies. This orientation was strong in the microregional approach in 1984-86. After the Fujimori shock package of August, 1990, the government, donor agencies and the Catholic Church called on the centers to assist in the social emergency program to provide relief aid to the underprivileged.

By cooperating too closely with the government, however, centers may come to be regarded as extensions of state services, or replacements for them. They may also lose their independence and capacity of criticism. The more connected to the State, the more exposed centers are to attack. Precisely, bilateral and multilateral programs have been high-risk targets for guerrillas because of their institutional contacts with the government and the high profile of big-scale projects.

In the regional and local setting, the gossip mill gives centers a reputation of using their resources for electoral purposes, instead of spending the last cent on helping campesinos. In comparison to the well-oiled campaigns of

the major parties, these political uses of resources may be insignificant. Typewriters and mimeographs may be used for election propaganda and communiques. Vehicles and gasoline may support election campaigns. Center programs are used for party patronage: appointment of grassroots leaders to GSO staff positions to lock in their organizations, conditioning of participation on party allegiance, etc. The use of prestige of directing a center as a springboard to elected office is also cited. GSO directors can become local leading lights because they can become part of the local system, requiring frequent coordination meetings with prefects, subprefects and other state functionaries. This kind of prestige can easily be translated in a political trampoline to elected political positions.

In Peru, with hundreds of programs of the past three decades, there have been incidents of this nature. On the other hand, many of these charges are ungrounded and are part of the suspicions of the real motives for working in rural areas. It is only natural that GSO staff be drawn to political roles in the current situation. Working in rural Peru requires a high degree of motivation and dedication. The personal drive may come from religious or political convictions or from social awareness. Frequently, this political motivation can lead to seeking elected office.

A veteran GSO director says that the centers have three kinds of workers: the political virgins who do not want to accept the political price of accepting a government job and compromising the work with campesinos; the political party activists who milk the funding to support their outreach; and those accepting the explicit goals of the GSOs (campesinos, rural development, grassroots organization). "The yields of the third group outweigh the price of the first two," he adds.
Over the past decade, most centers have made a concerted effort to depoliticize themselves by freeing themselves of party influence, as stated in Section One. However, many have gone to the other extreme, turning into technical islands, concerned with the minutiae and means of development, but losing sight of the broader political issues and the need to forge political organization (not necessarily party cells) to attain long-term goals.

Centers must also be careful to have clear guidelines about how and when staff may participate in politics. During the 1989-1990 elections season, several center staff members ran for elective office, but they usually resigned or took leaves of absence from their centers.

Program financing through profit-making schemes

A preoccupation of many GSOs and economists is the centers' dependency on foreign financing. No project, except a few tied to alpaca wool marketing for communities, could get by on its own resources. Most are going to be eternally begging resources. Removing international funding leaves two options, getting resources from local, regional and national governments or self-financing through profit-making schemes.

The former means building up political alliances, in the broadest sense of the word, to press for programs to continue. It means politicizing the projects so that broad sectors of the populace see their value. Some reforms of municipal and regional governments would have to take place. It also poses the possibility that these programs could be seen as another state program.

Self-sufficiency requiring a greater involvement in profit-making activities may also hold dangers. One of the buzzwords of the past decade has been to help grassroots organizations insert themselves into the market more advantageously. Sendero has made clear that it will not tolerate capital accumulation in peasant communities. In Puno and Junín, it has opposed communal enterprises, an attempt to use peasant community resources and ways to increase economic viability. Another problem is that Peruvian economic policy has been so unstable that the effective planning is impossible. Embarking peasants on profit-making schemes can be a frustrating experience.
Working with profit-making schemes means careful systems of checks and balance and a crystalline transparency and must go hand in hand with organization building. Those responsible for management of funds must be fully accountable to local partners and prepared to spend long hours putting down the most flagrant abuses of the local rumor mill.

Meeting the new challenges

By late 1988, most GSOs in rural areas had put into effect a series of precautionary measures. Centers should concentrate their staffs, offices and living quarters in province or department capitals. Staff should not stay overnight in the field or travel alone. Centers should give advance notice to local partners before going into the field for meetings, training sessions or other events to make sure that there is no unusual activity in the area.

Most centers have also lowered their institutional profile. The GSOs have to reduce the institutional showing off of parading their four-wheel drive vehicles, the surplus of engineers and agronomists and the ostentation of well-financed projects. The GSOs are now thinking in terms of cultural and rescue/recovery programs of Andean technologies, instead of selling technological packages imported from abroad. There still is a tendency of organizing for paternalistic assistentialism, but this also is used for demands closer to the hearts of the campesinos.

Additional measures include prohibiting liquor on field trips and standing guard at night. All centers have ruled out the possibility of having police escorts (the government offered this option to several bilateral programs).

Meetings with local partners are more restricted. Promoters make sure they have detailed information about participants. The old idea of the more, the merrier has ended.

In addition, centers have also acquire new buzzwords for orienting their policies. They call for the transfer of resources and programs to local partners and indirect management. This follows naturally from the reduced presence of the centers in the countryside. However, center staffs admit that efforts have been too brief and isolated to make a more systematic evaluation of progress in this direction.

Why does Sendero attack centers? They constitute platforms for development and organization. They are vulnerable, unarmed and frequently unprepared for attacks. They may serve, in Sendero's mind, as potential sources of intelligence to security forces. GSOs frequently occupy strategic zones where Senderista columns pass through or are setting up support bases. GSOs are normally not part of the local communities and more tolerable targets than residents. They are also are potential booties for sharing among the local residents, through organized looting. GSO staff members frequently have political party affiliation and are therefore part of the system. Both GSOs and Sendero are competing for the same terrain -- the fragile middle ground of institutions and organizations that have emerged over the past three decades or more. These organizations are possible rallying points for opposition to Sendero as well as catalysts for new means of inserting underprivileged groups into modern Peruvian society.

The centers have to differentiate between areas of risk and the types of programs and policies that they may carry out in each. Vicente Otta (1989, 29-32) makes three regional distinctions:

Emergency zones

Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín, Cerro de Pasco and Huanuco. Belligerent forces set the pace and dynamics. The main objective should be to maintain the existing limited spaces and keep organizations from being demolished by fear and reprisals. Otta says that center should increase technical-agrarian programs and broaden survival programs. Even what had been viewed as merely "assistentialismo" has value in keeping alive contacts and networks. Centers should increase contact with other institutions, like the Church, universities and professional associations. Many of these regions need an independent presence, but centers should seriously think out their programs before entering.

Active violence zones

Puno, Cusco, Lima provinces (like Huacho, Paramonga, Cañete, Pisco, Chincha and the Sierra of Lima). Centers should maintain a full presence taking advantage of Sendero's failure to have a permanent presence in these zones. Centers should engage in an effort to differentiate ideologically and politically Sendero and other violence-prone groups from other options, says Otta. They should help other groups assume a clear position of rejecting Sendero.

Rearguard zones

Tumbes, Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Tacna, Arequipa, Moquegua, Madre de Dios, Cajamarca and Amazonas. Otta suggested that centers should contribute to broadening democratic spaces and encourage normal reproduction of civilian society. For instance, there has an increase in donor agencies and centers feeling out the possibility of working in Cajamarca under the mantle of ronda campesinas. This strategic shoring-up of the rearguard, however, will be in vain if centers repeat the same errors as elsewhere.

Beyond these broadly defined risk zones, there is still room for more distinction. The presence of belligerent forces can vary from province to province within a department, from district to district in a province. Some previously active areas may become quiet for extended periods, in effect, becoming staging areas or reserves where subversives may rest and recover their strength. The overriding factor is the importance of a district or province within the subversives' military strategy, which have a peculiar manifestation in the Andes. Frequently, elements like concentration of population take a secondary role to other points such as geographic location as a link in communication. In the case of Sendero, its tactics seem to point to a strategy similar to the island hopping of the American armed forces in the Pacific theater during World War II.

When a guerrilla group decides to upgrade its presence in a zone, it decides who is its principal enemy. MRTA rarely picks GSOs as enemies. Sendero may ignore them (as in Huamanga province, Ayacucho) or turn them into primary targets as in Puno or Junín.

This regional evaluation can change overnight. During municipal and general elections, the presence of guerrillas and security forces increase, augmenting the potential for violence. Sendero has its own "revolutionary calendar" which punctuates cyclical campaigns with anniversaries. It has also become almost a ritual for Sendero to launch a wave of attacks whenever a minister of Interior or Defense tells the media that security forces have the guerrillas on the run. Guerrillas also take advantage of periods of government instability, like the post-economic package upheaval of September, 1988. When guerrillas are inaugurating a new theater of operations, they also tend to be more ruthless. Security force tend to be more aggressive when they are unveiling a "new counterinsurgency strategy."

Obviously, the period of 1990-1991 will be highly troubled because a new government will mean an all-out test of Peruvian resistance.
Some centers have been able to maintain programs in areas that are conflict-ridden. It has required a mental and methodological adjustment. It means taking a position which does not antagonize either sides. Because it is an all-out war, the only way to intervene is to take up arms against Sendero or the security forces because it is a question of who's the strongest. The experience of a rural development center in the old emergency zone is illustrative of the margins of actions available for development work.

"If Sendero's rules do not go against your conscience, the regulations of the institution or the law, then, you can abide by them," says one center director. Sendero has imposed rules on all outsiders working in the region.

1. No radio communication equipment.
2. No road improvements.
3. No support for political parties.
4. No projects specifically geared to selling in the market. Programs have to be aimed at self-consumption.
5. Programs should be aimed to the poorest campesinos.

The military rules are the following:

1. Reports every two months about what they are doing. Officers went to the sites to measure how many meters of irrigation canals had actually been dug and fitted.
2. Daily reports about the trips into the countryside from the base of operations. Usually, this requirement goes through a period of relaxation. Daily reports of "going to plant potatoes" in a community get monotonous.
3. The center must report when the staff cures a bullet wound or bumps into a guerrilla. Since the staff had never had to tend to a guerrilla, there has never been a report of this nature.

The same center has internal rules for working in the emergency zone.

1. No one can be publicly active in a political party. If he is, he should resign for his colleagues' sake.
2. The center complies with Sendero's armed strikes.
3. No foreign staff works in the project.
4. Outside visits are limited to two days,
5. No center meeting has more than three people. Doors and windows are kept open at all times to avoid the appearance of secrecy.
6. Hire people from the region to carry out the project.
7. Financing comes from within the Catholic sphere. There may be exceptions to this rule, but the general thrust of the program allows the center to explain and justify its work to local partners. The center has turned down funding from the government or collaborating with government programs, like agricultural credits or extension work.

In other areas, measures do not have to be so extreme. Indeed, the mandate is to take action which will prevent the situations from generating into the quagmire of Ayacucho emergency zone.

However, it should be obvious that no matter what precautionary measures grassroots support organizations (or centers or other civilian institutions) take, Sendero or the security forces can brush them aside.

Section Five:

Conclusions

This decade of growing violence has spun around the direction of the country to an "axis of war." In order to reverse this trend, institutions and individuals have to understand the new dynamics and urgencies. Trying to carry out rural development work with a business-as-usual attitude will end in frustration. This paper tries to pull together a few conclusions that might assist Peruvians in this task.

* Peru's 400 centers are no different from the rest of the country and the foreign counterparts playing a role in the country. The outburst of violence since 1980 has bewildered and shocked national elites. It has bled those unfortunate to be caught in the crossfire and paralyzed institutions that should lead the way out of the malaise.

* Centers are not shock troops to be thrown into middle of the fray. Nor can they simply remain passive observers in the conflict. We should not overestimate their capacity to influence events and results.

* Drawing on the Sur-Andino experience over the past two decades with elements from elsewhere in Peru, there are several key points that we should encourage in the shaping of a strategy of rural development efforts in the face of political violence.

First, participants in rural development should aim to develop a regional approach, without losing sight of the national and international horizons. This regional approach should also have the capacity to reach down into the microcosm of the individual in all its variety and nuances in Andean grassroots communities. It should lead towards the construction of superior levels of organizations, aiding them in formulating their experiences and expectations and making them comprehensible to outside groups and institutions. Isolated grassroots organizations will not be able to resist the onslaught of violence.

Second, a logical outgrowth of a regional strategy is the need for coordination, communication and pooling of information and experience. This also means being able to interlock projects and programs so there is feedback and little duplication of efforts. The coordination may be institutionalized or informal.

Third, retaining a reserve for moral, ethical and intellectual criticism and self-criticism is imperative. This also implies the capacity to give moral and political sanctions. This reserve space guarantees the foresight, reaction and flexibility to respond to new conditions. It also means a constant questioning of why the institutions and organizations are there, what they have to offer and what they aim to achieve.

Fourth, a willingness to move and work in different terrains gives centers the chance to "take refuge" in other lines of activities when political violence restricts overt action. Center and their local partners should work on practical and theoretical levels, latching on to technical, spiritual, political and cultural facets. It means that centers and their local partners should learn from engaging in dialogue and constructive work with local, regional and national governments, with political parties and interest groups. However, this effort should not compromise their operational and institutional independence or commitment to giving an increasing voice and power to grassroots organizations. Several experiences have shown that it is precisely in the "non-priority areas" that new lessons can be drawn about popular practices of resistance. These collateral issues also give grassroots legitimacy to development programs because they address many of the most sensitive problems facing grassroots organizations.
A crucial pressure point is the relationship between grassroots organizations and support organizations, on one side, and government on the other. Should the social emergency program compromise GSOs' independence due to the need to make relief aid available to popular organizations? Should GSOs' enthusiasm for regional governments (frequently in the hands of Izquierda Unida) jeopardize independence for future roles?

Fifth, organization should take priority over other more measurable targets. Proposals to use popular organizations as "cannon fodder" against subversives (civil defense committees) or other political adventures should be viewed with skepticism. The government can easily replace a fallen power pylon or a burned tractor. Grassroots organizations grow and mature over decades of sacrifice and effort, building up reserves of experience and leadership. This does not rule out the possibility that grassroots organizations chose to oppose the dynamics of violence. This means ceding a larger leadership role to grassroots organizations.

Not all these elements may be present in each zone or region, given the diversity and complexity of Peruvian reality. However, each has their peculiar features that can be linked together in a local strategy. Each has a key which can pull together organizations, as the land issue did in Puno or the rondas campesinas in Cajamarca.

* Centers, coordinating groups and national representations should continue fighting against the temptation to militarize the country. This can only be accomplished by broadening the scope of activities which centers usually considered theirs. Coordination should try to avoid turning into a time-consuming, bureaucratic affair. Frequently, subregional coordinating, if there are enough centers operating in the area, may be more helpful.

This painstaking work of coordination takes time, energy and resources. Most institutions do not have the personnel or capacity to confront this effort. Diverting staffers to coordinating tasks weakens their programs. Regional research centers may be more appropriate for this task.
Donor agencies should provide funding to open up these spaces. They should break out of their own institutional isolation and move towards pooling funding, resources and regional approaches to maximize their use. In times of scarcity, these resources should be seen as seed money for high-risk ventures in social survival.

Although Gianotten and De Wit (1990, 249) are referring to rural development per se, their comments are pertinent to violence: "If the center's actions are not linked with tasks of investigation, and vice versa, the center becomes an assistentialist instance, despite the discourse... All innovation has a cost. The task of centers is diminishing the cost of innovations for the popular sector." In this case, the savings will be in lives and the viability of democratic institutions.

* The search for conflict-free zones where GSOs may operate without the bogeyman of violence is in vain. GSOs and other development agencies must start from the assumption that guerrillas or other components of the violence formula will also seek virgin territory. Shifting programs to areas where violence has not taken deep roots may be a simple ruse for continuing with the routines and repertoires of methodology and technological packets. GSOs may end up repeating the same mistakes that they have made over the previous two decades. A self-critical examination of programs and lines of action should lead to a realignment of GSOs' practices. They and other members of civilian society should try to build bulwarks against violence, starting with their own practices.

There is more potential for consensus on the regional level than on the national stage. This means setting up channels for dialogue and understanding, engaging local partners and outside groups in debate and continual searches for bearings in periods of crisis. Development work should be a prophylactics against the dynamics of violence.
* GSOs which are not in the direct firing line should make a thorough evaluation of their programs and projects, their methods of working with local partners and their goals. There is a dormant period of two to five years for Sendero to erupt into its virulent phase. Observers may not detect Sendero's presence because it is merely sounding out the territory, testing the ground for potential conflicts and recruits. It is all too easy to dismiss early signs (bombings, clandestine visits to schools) as rogue columns, copycat dissidents or outside interference.

* Programs that have high capital investment needs, high operating costs and long maturity periods should be examined with care. Their costs and visible infrastructure mean that they become power symbols and targets of political envy and sabotage.

Aseptically technical programs are going to be vulnerable because they have the most superficial roots scattered among communities and beneficiaries. They rarely have the political bearings to steer through troubled situations. From the section on Allpachaka experimental station and its extension to other centers of abstract research, it should be clear that programs that cannot show practical and immediate relevance can come under attack, even in the more secure conditions of Lima. The investment required to put up research installations and living quarters for qualified staff end up looking like enclaves of prosperity.

* One key to confronting the challenge of political violence is promoting the local "beneficiaries" (passive recipients of programs and services) to full status as partners in rural development. This may mean readjusting the methods and goals of programs, blurring technical purity and goal-oriented approaches. It means devoting more efforts and energy towards the slow, painful task of generating lasting organizations and deep leadership.

"Projects with consolidated counterparts have more of a chance of continuing because the local communities can assume the leadership of the projects," says a development expert.
* New priorities for aid and social organization emerge in situations of upheaval. The 10 years of expanding violence has set off a process of migration that will have as traumatic effects as the mitimaes of the Incas, the reducciones of the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the urban-bound migration of 1960-80. This displacement of whole communities takes place in the adverse conditions of economic crisis, chronic underemployment and political repression. In fact, it seems that this is a deliberated strategy objective employed by Sendero. It aims to heighten the burden on the outmoded social structure and break down the makeshift safety net of the underprivileged.
The economic adjustment program of the Fujimori government is already stretching relief resources and grassroots support organizations to the maximum.

These new shifts in population mean that new fluxes of needy will be demanding emergency services.

* A fresh look should be given to handouts and charity work, despite the serious criticism aimed as asistencialismo over the past three decades. Frequently, donations of medicine, foodstuffs and agricultural inputs or tools are one of the few means of maintaining contacts with former participants of networks in emergency zones. Donations are the means of showing that someone still cares and of keeping whatever organizations existed in place. It maintains the personal commitment and trust which lies at the heart of effective development work. We have to find new, creative means to use these donations as levers for reversing the tide of violence, and not just preconditions for subservience.
An Ayacucho director says, "Direct assistance is messy. You've got to get your hands dirty, giving comfort and getting involved, making local people participate. We don't want to make professional beggars." There are several kinds of unconventional formulas that should be sought out in situations of political risk. These groups do not offer all the paraphernalia of GSOs but offer unique access to marginalized groups. These groups give high yield on allocated funds and involve local organizations. They are the types of groups which do not go knocking on the doors of donor agencies for funding. Both centers and donor agencies would be well-served by seeking them out. Donor agencies must actively seek them out through a profound knowledge of provincial networks.

* There is a need for the continual study of political violence, its historical context, its social and political dynamics and other facets. For instance, the military have blind spots in their perspective, including poor use and pooling of intelligence. The issue of violence is too important to leave it in the military's hands.
There are several groups now studying it and coordinating their work: human rights groups and research centers like the Instituto de Defensa Legal, Democracia y Socialismo-Instituto de Política Popular, DESCO, Instituto Bartoleme de las Casas (Lima) and CEAPAZ. The ANC has set up a permanent commission of political violence and development. InterCentros has a task force.
The study of violence over the past decade has relied on a few specialists, tagged Senderologists and violentologists who have done the ground-breaking work. Journalists, anthropologists and historians, combined with human rights advocates have been the disciplines following the problem. Carlos Ivan Degregori, Raúl González, Nelson Manrique and Gustavo Gorriti have all made contributions. These investigators do so at personal risk because publishing their findings may provoke reprisals. The fact has also kept many individuals in provinces and shantytowns from contributing publicly because they could also be targets for reprisals and jeopardize their capacity to continue working.

The phase of individualist studies has ended. The problem is too complex and intertwined for individuals to have an effective impact. Just as counterinsurgency is too important to leave exclusively in the hands of the military, the issue of political violence is too vital to the country to leave in the hands of "Shining Pathologists and violentologists." These studies need

to mesh with team efforts, coordinated among organizations so they do not duplicate efforts. It would also provide instances where front-line participants could add their experience without risk.
However, there is a serious danger of intellectualizing the problem, taking such a distant, cool perspective that it is hard to convert conclusions and recommendations into concrete action. This is where rural development centers and others can make a major contribution by drawing on their first-hand experience with grassroots organization to draw on peasant defense and resistance experiences through established partnerships of trust and to lower the discussion to a more pragmatic level.

There is a gaping hole in the response to what grassroots organizations are going through. Most proposals for pacification, counterinsurgency policy and other points tend to get lost in national issues and legal reform. They do not provide guidelines and explanations for those who are closest to the fighting.

* GSOs and other development efforts will not advance towards achieving their goals unless there exists a medium-term horizon of stability and governance. The current situation of extreme economic upheaval and government instability imposes new priorities. GSO staffs have to grabble with the problem of matching funding with rising expenditures. They have to adjust their programs to shifting realities. They have to deal with their own role and institutional relationships. The crisis throws the carefully laid survival strategies of grassroots organizations into the trashbin.

The key variables in this situation are market and the Peruvian state. (Gianotten and De Wit 1990, 250) International assistance through governments, donor agencies and multinational organizations can play a role in helping Peru find a level keel.
A serious question is how Peru can respond to the macroeconomic demands of the crisis and still address the problems of Andean development. If a line of tension underlying the violence has been the rural-urban interface, then an attempt to force an urban-exterior logic on the entire country could have a deteriorating effect on the Andes.

This macro policy issue also touches on other components in the violence equation, like the police, the armed forces and law enforcement system. Only a medium-term effort to join civilian institutions and security forces in establishing mutually acceptable policies of pacification will provide a more viable framework for development work.
This does not mean that GSOs do not have a role at this juncture. In fact, there are many new challenges facing them, aiding their local partners.

* It corresponds to donor agencies to keep these niches of civilian society viable. It may be a temptation to shut down shop for a while until the political and economic panorama clears up (fewer hassles in headquarters to justify expenditures on projects that are behind schedule and the moral qualms of placing staff members and local partners in risky situations). Unfortunately, when those donor agencies return to Peru, they may find that the enclaves (centers and grassroots organizations) are no longer viable. However, this should not mean a perennial blank check for rural

development centers or the prerequisite of accountability for projects and programs. Poorly conceived and executed projects should be sanctioned with their modification or suspension. There remains the problem of setting up a clear, mutually acceptable, flexible criteria of efficiency and profitability for judging the performance and merits of promotional development under these trying circumstances.

* Peru's centers represent one of the independent spaces generated within Peruvian society in the past three decades. They have a degree of accountability to their donor agencies and grassroots associates. They have the opportunity to link theory and praxis in concrete situations. Their hands-on experience with grassroots organizations is an invaluable asset for the future.

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